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1 Introduction
Variations in the rules that govern who can vote have a fundamental impact on pol-
icy choices and on the longer term development prospect of a society. Historically,
the power to elect or appoint leaders Kings or Parliaments was the privilege of
small elites who derived substantial benets from this privilege. Today in modern
democracies, political power is more evenly spread and elections are governed by the
principle of one (adult) person one vote. A major puzzle in political economics is
why a powerful incumbent elite would want to share power with broader segments of
the population. After all, by doing so, it dilutes its own political base and stands to
lose signicant economic rents. The threat of revolution hypothesissuggests that
the elite o¤ers voting rights to avoid revolution (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson,
2000, 2006).1 They do so whenever they perceive the risk to be su¢ ciently real.
Seen in this perspective, democratization is preemptive democratization triggered
by threat perceptions.
The historical record provides many suggestive examples consistent with this
hypothesis2 as does the wave of democratic reform that swept across North Africa
during the Arab Spring. Beyond such examples, however, there exists surprisingly
little systematic, statistical evidence. The reason is that it, unlike civil war and
actual revolution, is hard to quantify the threat of a revolution. In this paper, we
develop a measure of the threat of a revolution and conduct a new test of the threat
of revolution hypothesis. We argue that international di¤usion of information re-
lated to regime contentionin particular actual large-scale revolutionary activities
in other countriesmay inuence regime dynamics abroad through two channels.
Firstly, those seeking a regime change through revolution might take inspiration
from events in other countries. Secondly, the defenders of the old autocratic regime
may update their assessment of how threatening the domestic situation is, and
revaluate the likely consequences of a revolution or the scope for repression. Based
1For alternative economic theories of franchise extension, see Falkinger (1999), Justman and
Gradstein (1999), Conley and Temini (2001), Boix (2003), Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Llavador and
Oxoby (2005), Jack and Laguno¤ (2006), Congleton (2007, 2011), Aidt et al. (2010), Engerman
and Sokolo¤ (2012, chapter 4) or Aidt and Albornoz (2011).
2See, e.g., Tilly (1995) and Weyland (2010).
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on this, they then decide whether to relinquish power and extend voting rights
preemptively. In short, we use international di¤usion of information about actual
revolutions to quantify the perceived threat of revolution.
This approach has two major advantages that sets it apart from previous tests.
The rst advantage is that we can quantify the threat of revolution for the critical
period in the 19th and early 20th centuries during which the franchise was in fact
extended in Europe. Previous research has been unable to do so. Przeworski (2009),
for example, tests the threat of revolution hypothesison a world sample afterWorld
War I and Kim (2007) studies the link between strike activity and franchise reform
in a sample of 12 Western European countries between 1880 and World War II. Our
data allow us to start the analysis in 1820. The second advantage is that we provide
a direct test of the theory. Previous work by Brückner and Ciccone (2011) and Burke
and Leigh (2010) establish causal links between economic shocks and democratic
change which are consistent with the theory. Chaney (2013) uses deep historical
data on deviant Nile oods to show that the political power of religious leaders
increased during periods of economic downturn and interprets this as evidence that
these leaders could coordinate a revolt. We go beyond this literature by assessing
the link between the threat of revolution and democratic change directly.
We implement our test on two samples of European countries between 1820 and
1938. The focus on Europe is justied for at least two reasons. Firstly, Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000) motivate their theory with detailed examples from Britain,
Germany, Sweden, and France. Accordingly, although the theory of preemptive
democratization is generally applicable, it is arguably particularly relevant for un-
derstanding regime dynamics in 19th and early 20th century Europe. Secondly,
(modern) democratic institutions originated in Europe and spread to other parts
of the world, rst through colonization (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al.,
2001) and in more recent times by providing a blueprint for the design of demo-
cratic constitutions. Seen in this perspective, gaining a better understanding of
how democracy came about in Europe is an important stepping stone for under-
standing the spread of democracy across the world and, therefore, ultimately for
understanding the inuence of institutions on long-run economic development.
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Our results, based on two very di¤erent research designs, show that the threat
of revolution had a major e¤ect, not only on franchise extension as measured by
the fraction of the adult population with the right to vote but also on the timing
of major su¤rage reforms. The baseline result is that one extra revolutionary event
somewhere in Europe is associated with a two percentage point expansion of the
fraction of the male population with the right to vote in neighboring countries and
with a 75 percent increase in the odds of a su¤rage reform.
There are two ways to read these results. The rst is to give them a causal
interpretation. This requires that revolutionary events in other countries are uncor-
related with unobserved country and time specic causes of democratization and
that these events only a¤ect democratization in a particular country through the ef-
fect on the perceived probability of revolution in that country. We control for many
potential determinants of democratization, such as national income, urbanization,
education, war, trade integration, inequality, enlightenment shocks, etc. and for un-
observed country specic xed factors and common time shocks. Yet, it is possible
that countries which were readyto democratize happened to be more exposed to
revolutionary shocks from abroad for reasons we do not observe. Using the method
proposed by Altonji et al. (2005), we nd that selection on unobservablesmust
be 2.5-5.9 times stronger than selection on observablesfor our baseline result to
be entirely explained by selection bias. While perhaps not impossible, we nd this
highly implausible. Taken together, this gives us reason to believe that there is a
causal link. The second way to read the results is as suggestive conditional corre-
lations which are consistent with the threat of revolution hypothesis. The value
of uncovering these correlations is two-fold. Firstly, our data allow us to establish
a strong positive correlation between the threat of revolution and democratization
for the entire rst wave of democratization. Previous research has focussed mostly
on later waves or on part of the rst wave only. Moreover, the correlation that we
uncover is extremely robust to estimation method and di¤erent sets of variables
capturing other theories of franchise reform.3 Secondly, we emphasize international
3The correlations uncovered by Kim (2007) for the period 1880 to 1938 are, for example, not
robust to controlling for unobserved country or time xed e¤ects. Przeworski (2009) focuses on
bivariate correlations between his measure of the threat (based on data on riots and strikes) and
his measure of democratization in order to maximize the number of cases.
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di¤usion of information on regime contention as one possible mechanism through
which the threat of revolution might have induced preemptive democratization.4
This provides a new perspective on the theory.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a two-
country model of (preemptive) franchise reform which motivates our empirical inves-
tigation. In section 3, we present data on revolutionary threats and su¤rage reform.
In section 4, we present our two research designs. In sections 5 and 6, we report the
results and discuss confounding factors. In section 7, we discuss other theories of
franchise reform. In section 8, we conclude. The supplementary material contains
a Theory Appendix with some proofs, three data appendices (Data Appendix A to
C) detailing our data material and the sources consulted and providing a table with
descriptive statistics. Appendix D contains additional econometric checks.
2 Theory
Our test of the threat of revolution hypothesisis based on the idea that revolution-
ary events abroad represent shocks to the information set of the old regime elites
and to potential revolutionaries and may, through those two channels, be triggers
of su¤rage reform. To illustrate this logic, we develop a two-country version of
Acemoglu and Robinsons (2000) model of preemptive franchise extension.5
2.1 Assumptions
We consider two countries, indexed by i 2 f1; 2g, with an innite time horizon,
t = 0; 1; :::1. We omit, for simplicity, the country index on variables and parameters
that, by assumption, are the same. The political state in country i (SPolit ) at time
t can be either democracy (D), autocracy (A), or a post-revolutionary regime (S),
i.e., SPolit 2 fD;A;Sg. Each country is populated by two groups, called the insiders
and the outsiders, and indexed by g 2 fI; Og.6 Utility is discounted by the factor
4The literature on civil war also emphasizes international di¤usion (Sambanis and Hegre, 2006).
We focus on the di¤usion of the threat of revolution rather than full-blown civil war. Revolution
and conict have many causes including economic shocks (Berger and Spoerer, 2001) and ethnical
conict (Esteban et al. 2012).
5See Dorsch and Maarek (2014) for a related model.
6We use the terms insidersand outsidersto allow for alternative interpretations. Typically,
the insiders represent the old regime elites (e.g., the landed aristocracy) while the outsiders may
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. We specify the per-period utility per member of group g as functions of the
prevailing political state and denote them by yg
 
SPolit

.7 Under autocracy, the
insiders, despite being a minority, control the government and bias policy in their
favour. The utility of each insider is yI(A), while that of each outsider is yO (A) <
yI(A). Under democracy, the outsiders hold the majority and introduce policies
that benet them and harm the insiders. As a consequence, yI(A) > yI(D) > 0
and yO(A) < yO(D). Finally, in the post-revolutionary regime, the insiders fare
worse than under democracy, while the outsiders are better o¤, i.e., yI(S) = 0 and
yO(S)  yO(D).8 We treat the insiders and outsiders of each country as (four)
players of a dynamic game and refer to them collectively as the decision makers.
The initial political state is autocracy in both countries. A regime transition
happens either through a revolution or through democratization. We use the term
revolutionbroadly to mean any form of costly social transformation forced upon
the insiders by the outsiders,9 whereas democratization is understood as orderly
political transformation designed and controlled by the insiders. We denote the
outsidersdecision to attempt a revolution by it 2 fY;Ng ; where it = Y means
that an attempt was made and it = N that no attempt was made. A revolution
attempt costs each outsider  units of utility and its success depends on the social
state (SSoct 2 fG;Bg). In social state B, a revolution always fails. In social state
G, it succeeds with probability p. The post-revolutionary regime is an absorbing
represent the working class, moderate liberals recruited from the upper middle class and the liberal
aristocracy, an emerging lower middle class, parts of new industrial elites, or intellectuals and dis-
contented gentry. The post-revolutionary regime and democracy can, accordingly, be interpreted
as socialism versus parliamentary government elected on universal su¤rage, as a republic (with
rules that are particularly biased against the old regime elites) versus a constitutional monarchy
with aristocratic control of an upper chamber but popular elections to a lower chamber, etc.
7These can be derived from specic assumptions about endowments, production technologies,
and tax instruments, as in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006). By not explicitly modeling policy
choices, we rule out that the insiders may o¤er scal transfers to avoid a revolution. The choice
between scal transfers and a franchise extension is vital for understanding why democratization
has commitment value, but is not important for understanding our empirical strategy. We return
to the question of transfers in Section 4.
8Tullock (1971) and Kuran (1989) stress that it is the private returns that matter for an
individuals incentive to participate in a revolution. We assume that non-participating outsiders
are excluded from the benets associated with the post-revolutionary regime (see Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2000, p. 1172).
9Accordingly, revolution attempts can take many di¤erent forms, ranging from a challenge
from an emerging liberal-minded or radical middle class to a full-blown communist challenge as
in Russia in 1917.
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state. The discounted utility of an outsider after a successful revolution is yO(S)
1   .
The key assumption of the model is that the social states in the two countries
are (positively) correlated. Correlation can be induced by international business
cycle shocks, by weather shocks or by disease-induced crop failures (e.g., the potato
blight). Alternatively, the source of correlation may be purely informational. A
successful revolution requires coordination amongst the revolutionaries. Seeing a
successful revolution abroad may foster coordination either through a demonstration
e¤ect or by serving as a rally call. The correlation need not be equally strong
between all pairs of countries and, in practice, its strength is a function of economic,
social and geographical proximity. For the purpose of the theoretical analysis,
however, we make the extreme assumption that the social state is the same in the
two countries and is transitory, but all we need is some degree of correlation.
To avoid a revolution, the insiders can extend the franchise (dit 2 fY;Ng) or
they can repress (rit 2 fY;Ng). A preemptive franchise extension transfers power
permanently to the outsiders and is su¢ cient to prevent a revolution.10 Repression
makes any attempt at revolution unsuccessful but costs each insider  > 0 units
of utility. Neither the insiders nor the outsiders observe the social state directly.11
They must, therefore, estimate based on reports (Lit) what the social state is
before acting. The decision makers of a given country observe the same reports
and in the absence of an informative report, everyone agree that the social state is
G with probability q < 1.12 The substantive assumption is that the reports di¤er
across countries. In country 1, the decision makers receive local reports, i.e., reports
that are not directly observed by decision makers in country 2. These reports are
either uninformative (L1t = 1) or informative (L1t = l) where l 2 (q; 1). Upon
receiving a report, the decision makers update their belief that the social state is
G to q1t = Pr(GjL1t) = qL1t . Since l 2 (q; 1), the belief that the social state is
G is revised upwards after receiving an informative report and not revised after
an uninformative report, i.e., Pr(Gj l) = q
l
> Pr(Gj 1) = q.13 In country 2, the
10A su¢ cient condition is that  > yO(S) yO(D)1  .
11See Andrews and Jackson (2005).
12Since at time t no reports for future periods have yet been received, all decision makers believe
at time t that the social state is G with probability q from period t+ 1 onwards.
13The restriction on l implies that the beliefs are never downgraded after receiving an informative
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decision makers observe what happened in country 1 as information di¤uses from
one country to another. In particular, they observe the political state of country 1
and the decisions made by the insiders (d1t and r1t) and by the outsiders (1t), i.e.,
L2t 2

SPol1t ; d1t; r1t; 1t
	
, and base their decisions on these international reports.
At the beginning of each period, the social state SSoct 2 fG;Bg is determined
by Nature. The decision makers in country 1 act before those in country 2 and they
only need to act if the political state is autocracy (SPol1t = A).14 In that case, the
sequence of events is:
1. The decision makers in country 1 receive the local report L1t 2 f1; lg and
update their belief about the threat of revolution to q1t = Pr(GjL1t).
2. The insiders decide whether to extend the franchise (d1t) or to repress (r1t).
(a) If they extend, country 1 becomes a democracy (SPol1t = D) and utilities
for the period are yg(D) for g 2 fI; Og, and the period ends.
(b) If they repress, any attempt at revolution fails (so the outsiders never
revolt). The political state continues to be autocracy (SPol1t = A) and
utilities, gross of the utility cost of repression , for the period are yg(A)
for g 2 fI; Og, and the period ends.
(c) If they decide to neither extend nor to repress, then stage 3 applies.
3. The outsiders decide whether or not to initiate a revolution. If they do and
the social state is G, country 1 experiences with probability p a transition to
the post-revolutionary regime (SPol1t = S) while with probability 1   p, the
revolution fails and the country continues in autocracy (SPol1t = A). If the
social state is B, a revolution always fails. Utilities for the period are, gross
of the utility cost of revolution , yg(SPol1t ) for g 2 fI; Og and SPol1t 2 fS;Ag,
and the period ends. If the outsiders do not attempt a revolution, the country
continues in autocracy and utilities are yg(A) for g 2 fI; Og, and the period
ends.
report. We could allow for this by adding a third type of report, but this complicates the analysis
without adding extra insights. The restriction also ensures that Pr(Gj l) is bounded below 1.
14If SPol1t 2 fD;Sg at time t, no further decisions are required.
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The sequence of events in country 2 is similar, except for stage 1:
1. The decision makers in country 2 receive the international report L2t 2
SPol1t ; d1t; r1t; 1t
	
and update their beliefs about the threat of revolution to
q2t = Pr(GjL2t).
We emphasize two features of the information structure. Firstly, nobody ob-
serves the social state directly. For this reason, the model exhibits equilibrium
paths, along which revolutions actually happen.15 Secondly, international di¤usion
of information cannot by itself explain preemptive su¤rage extensions. An initial
trigger is needed. This is the role played by the local reports in country 1.
2.2 Analysis
We rst study pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria in country 1. Subsequently,
we study how international di¤usion of information about events in that country
a¤ects regime dynamics in country 2.
2.2.1 Regime Dynamics in Country 1
The so-called revolution constraint, which controls whether the outsiders in stage 3
revolt or not, plays an important role for regime dynamics and we begin the analysis
with a discussion of it. Since the outsides do not know the true social state, they
revolt if their updated belief (q1t) that the state is G is greater than the threshold16
bqREV OLT  1
p
(1  )
yO(S)  yO(A) (1)
and do not revolt if q1t < bqREV OLT . We make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 q < bqREV OLT < q(1 p)l pq .
This assumption guarantees that the outsiders never revolt after observing an un-
informative report (L1t = 1 ) q1t = q) but they will revolt upon observing an
15In Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), where all parties are fully informed about the social state,
revolutions cannot happen in equilibrium because the insiders always want to preempt it. Ellis and
Fender (2011) study a richer environment in which information cascades can generate revolutions.
16Derivation of this and subsequent conditions are in the Theory Appendix included with the
supplementary material.
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informative report (L1t = l) q1t = ql > q(1 p)l pq ) unless the insiders take preemptive
action.17 In the latter case, the revolution constraint binds.
In stage 2, the insiders foresee whether the revolution constraint binds or not.
When it binds, they face a choice between three options: democratize, repress, or
run the risk of a revolution. We rank these options as follows. First, franchise
extension is better than repression if
[D] :  >
yI(A)  yI(D)
1   : (2)
Condition [D] shows that the insiders of a country with an ine¤ective repression
technology (a high ) or in which democracy does not pose a serious threat to them
(yI(A)  yI(D) is small)perhaps because income inequality is modestare likely to
prefer to extend the franchise preemptively rather than to repress. Second, if the
updated belief following an informative report (q1t =
q
l
) is su¢ ciently large, then
either repression or democratization dominates running the risk of a revolution.
More specically, if condition [D] holds, then a preemptive franchise extension is
optimal if
q
l
 1
p
yI(A)  yI(D)
yI(A)  bqDEMOCRACY (3)
and if [D] fails, then repression is optimal if
q
l
 1
p
 (1  )
yI(A)  bqREPRESSION : (4)
We make the following additional assumptions.
Assumption 2 bqREV OLT < min fbqDEMOCRACY ; bqREPRESSIONg.
Assumption 3  < pyI(A)
1  .
Assumption 2 ensures that the outsiders are willing to revolt in situations where
the insiders are unwilling to preempt a revolt. Assumption 3 imposes a lower bound
on how willing they are to run this risk. It plays a role for the regime dynamics in
country 2. Proposition 1 characterizes the Markov Perfect equilibrium in country
1.
17It is su¢ cient for the analysis of country 1 to assume that bqREV OLT < ql . We assume thatbqREV OLT < q(1 p)l pq because this restriction matters for the analysis of country 2.
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Proposition 1 (Political transitions in country 1) Assume that Assumption 1 and
2 hold and that country 1 is an autocracy at the begining of period t.
1. Suppose that L1t = 1. The outsiders never revolt and the insiders never repress
or extend the franchise preemptively. The political regime continues to be A.
2. Suppose that L1t = l.
(a) If condition [D] holds and q
l
 bqDEMOCRACY , then a preemptive franchise
extension takes place. The political regime becomes D and no revolt is
attempted.
(b) If condition [D] fails and q
l
 bqREPRESSION , then the insiders repress.
The political regime continues to be A and no revolt is attempted.
(c) If q
l
< min fbqREPRESSION ; bqDEMOCRACY g, the insiders take no preemp-
tive action and a revolt takes place. If it fails, the political regime con-
tinues to be A. If it succeeds, the political regime becomes S.
2.2.2 Regime Dynamics in Country 2
The decision makers in country 2 observe the political state and the choices made
by the insiders (repression or su¤rage reform) and the outsiders (revolt in country
1, i.e., (L2t =

SPol1t ; 1t; r1t; d1t
	
). Given this information, they update their beliefs,
q2t = Pr (GjL2t) ; about the social state rationally using Proposition 1 and, in turn,
base their decisions to reform, repress, or revolt on this. The thresholds bqREV OLT ,bqREPRESSION; and bqDEMOCRACY and condition [D] are the same as in country 1.
We summarize this di¤usion process as follows:
1. Suppose the political state of country 1 is A, that the insiders of country 1
did not repress (r1t = N), and that the outsiders did not revolt (1t = N).
Then the decision makers in country 2 conclude that L1t = 1 and believe that
q2t = q. Given that, the revolution constraint does not bind in country 2 (and
the outsiders will not revolt) and the political state remains A.
2. If the decision makers in country 2 observe either a preemptive franchise
extension (d1t = Y ) or repression (r1t = Y ), then they conclude that L1t = l.
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This is not su¢ cient to establish if the social state is, in fact, G but makes
it more likely that it is. The updated probability that the social state is G
is q
l
> q. Given Assumption 1, the revolution constraint binds. The insiders
respond by imitating the choice made by the insiders in country 1.
3. If the decision makers in country 2 observe a successful revolution (1t = Y
and SPol1t = S) in country 1, they can unambiguously conclude that the social
state is G. The revolution constraint binds. Given Assumption 3, the insiders
want to preempt a local revolt, either through a preemptive franchise extension
if condition [D] holds or by repression otherwise.
4. If the decision makers in country 2 observe an unsuccessful revolt (1t = Y
and SPol1t = A), they conclude that L1t = l but cannot deduce if the social
state is, in fact, G. The updated probability that the social state is G is
q2t = Pr (Gj fA; Y;N;Ng) =
q
l
(1  p)
1  q
l
+ (1  p) q
l
=
q (1  p)
l   pq <
q
l
: (5)
By Assumption 1, q(1 p)
l pq > bqREV OLT and the revolution constraint binds.
Since the insiders in country 1 did not do anything to prevent the revolt,
Assumption 2 implies that
bqREV OLT < q
l
< min fbqDEMOCRACY ; bqREPRESSIONg : (6)
Since q(1 p)
l pq <
q
l
, the insiders in country 2 do not want to preempt a revolt
either. A failed revolution attempt in country 1 triggers a revolution attempt
in country 2. This generates a revolution snowball e¤ect.
We present the key insights from this analysis in two propositions.
Proposition 2 (Preemptive franchise extension). Let Assumptions 1 to 3 hold.
Suppose that
q
l
< min fbqDEMOCRACY ; bqREPRESSIONg : (7)
A successful revolution in country 1 triggers a preemptive su¤rage reform in country
2 if condition [D] holds and repression if not.
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The revolution shockoriginating from country 1 di¤uses to country 2 through two
channels. On the one hand, it serves as a rally call for the outsiders who upon
observing the successful revolution abroad believe that they will (most likely) be
successful as well. This makes the threat of revolution credible in country 2. On
the other hand, it provides conclusive evidence to the insiders that they must act
preemptively to avoid a revolution.18 They do so either through preemptive su¤rage
reform or, if they have access to an e¤ective repression technology ( is low) or
feel particularly threatened by democracy (yI(A)   yI(D) is large), by repression.
This captures the logic behind our test of the threat of revolution hypothesis: we
propose to study empirically if revolutionary events in other countries a¤ect the
likelihood of su¤rage reform at home positively.
In addition to this main test, the theory suggests auxiliary tests. First, a given
revolution shockabroad has a smaller impact on su¤rage reform (1) in countries
where the insiders are particularly threatened by democracy and (2) in countries
that are distant from the source of the revolutionary event. The rst auxiliary
test follows directly from condition [D]. The second auxiliary test follows from the
observation that a revolution shockin country 1 has no e¤ect on su¤rage reform
in country 2 if the social states were independent. Insofar as the strength of the
correlation between the social states is related to economic, social and geograph-
ical distance between pairs of countries, the theory delivers this second auxiliary
prediction. The next proposition states one further prediction:
Proposition 3 (Democracy begets democracy). Let Assumptions 1 to 3 hold. Sup-
pose condition [D] holds and that
q
l
> bqDEMOCRACY : (8)
A franchise extension in country 1 triggers a franchise extension in country 2.
This proposition highlights an indirect channel through which information about
revolutionary threats can di¤use internationally and be a cause of preemptive de-
mocratization. It happens when the insiders in country 2 observe a preemptive
18They learn that the social state is G and given Assumption 3, they act preemptively.
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su¤rage reform in country 1. From this, they deduce that the revolution constraint
must be binding and that they must take action if they want to prevent a revolt
at home. Since the insiders in country 1 democratized preemptively, it is optimal
for the insiders in country 2 to imitate. The reason is not that democracy has any
intrinsic value or that a certain spur of enlightenment has a¤ected the insiders
attitude to reform. The reason is that the (preemptive) reform in country 1 warns
them that they too must act to avoid a revolution. This provides an additional
empirical implication which we can test empirically.
3 Franchise Reforms and the Threat of Revolu-
tion: Measurements
To test the threat of revolution hypothesis, we need quantitative measures of de-
mocratization and the threat of revolution. We equate democratization with the
extension of the franchise for two reasons. Firstly, the hypothesis is rst and fore-
most a hypothesis of franchise extension. Secondly, the hypothesis does not imply
that the old regime elites needed to introduce the full package of democratic institu-
tions (voting rights to all adults, secret ballot, civil liberties, e¤ective accountability,
etc.). On the contrary, it suggests that the elites would seek to grant the minimum
concession needed to calm the watersand avoid a revolution. Accordingly, the
preemptive reforms induced by the threat of revolution often involved sharing as
little de facto power as possible, or as Tilly (1995, p. 24) puts it, in his discussion of
the Great Reform Act of 1832 in Britain, the expanded su¤rage a¤orded resulted
from the governments frightened, but astutely minimal concessions to popular mo-
bilization.19 Granting the right to vote is by far the most visible and immediate
de jure democratic concession that an elite can make and, therefore, in practice the
most likely candidate for preemptive democratization.20 This, we believe, makes
19De facto power conferred to newly enfranchised groups can be limited in many ways. For
example, it was common to maintain bicameral systems. While the franchise for the lower chamber
was widened, the old regime elites preserved control of the upper chamber and through that the
right to veto policy. Another mechanism was outright electoral corruption, often maintained
by keeping the ballot open. The material point is whether the concessions at the time they were
o¤ered were accepted by the potential revolutionaries and thus eliminated the threat of revolution,
and not whether they with the benet of hindsight reallocated a lot of de facto political power.
20As emphasized by Kuran (1989), revolutions require leadership as well as popular support to
succeed. Consequently, democratization can, in principle, preempt revolution by granting conces-
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composite measures of democratization, such as those proposed by Przeworski et al.
(2000) or Boix (2003) and used extensively in research on the causes of democratic
change during the third wave of democratization (see, e.g., Gassebner et al. (2013)),
inappropriate for our test.
Given this choice, we measure enfranchisement of hitherto disenfranchised social-
economic groups of adult men, as opposed to enfranchisement of, say, women or the
young. We do this in two ways. Firstly, we record the size of the electorate (with
the right to vote in national elections to the lower legislative chamber) in percentage
of its reference age and sex group over time and space. Before womens su¤rage,
the reference group is all men of voting age, and after, it is all citizens of voting
age. This measure, which we call su¤rage, quanties on a scale from 0 to 100 the
impact of income, property holding, and wealth restrictions on the right to vote in
isolation from the e¤ect of womens su¤rage. We assign the value of zero to su¤rage
for the years before national elections to the (lower) legislative body were based on
a well-dened set of su¤rage rules. This measure can, based on information from
Flora et al. (1983), be constructed for the 12 Western European countries listed in
panel A of Table 1. Secondly, we record in column two of Table 1 the year of all
reforms that enfranchise new socioeconomic groups by lowering income and property
requirements, etc.21 Information on this can be obtained for the ten additional
countries listed in panel B of the table.22 We refer to the sample of 21 countries as
the broader European sampleand the sample of the 12Western European countries
as the Western European sample. The transition to constitutional democracy was
progressive and gradual in most countries. Yet, Italy, Austria, Spain, Portugal,
and Germany during the interwar period and France during the Second Empire
from 1852 to 1869 constitute examples of backlashes to democracy. The years of
sions to the potential revolutionary leadership without o¤ering much to the popular supporters of
revolution. In particular, in the 19th century, where the potential leadership was typically found
amongst the radicals and liberal-minded middle classes, small franchise extensions that beneted
these groups could be e¤ective in stopping a revolution in the making. A good example of this is
the Great Reform Act of 1832 in Britain (see, e.g. Aidt and Franck, 2014).
21Data Appendix A contains a detailed discussion of the coding of each reform.
22A country enters the sample when it becomes an independent state and drops out if it regresses
back into some form of autocracy or into civil war. Data Appendix A provides further details on
the construction of the sample. We report the year of entry and, if applicable, year of exit for
each country in column 1 of Table 1.
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these and other examples of (de facto) franchise contractions are listed in column
four. We explore this information to account for the durability of past franchise
extensions.
Our test of the threat of revolution hypothesis is, as discussed above, based
on the idea that regime contention and information on revolutionary events di¤use
internationally. To quantify this di¤usion process, we have recorded 42 revolution-
ary events in Europe during the period.23 Revolutionary eventsare dened as
those instances when for a month or more at least two blocs of people backed by
armed force and receiving support from a substantial part of the general population
exercised control over important segments of the state organization, Tilly (2004,
p. 73). We have excluded instances of coup détat and civil war since they are
conceptually di¤erent. The years of the revolutionary eventsare listed in column
three of Table 1.24 These include the three major waves of revolution in Europe
that occurred in 1820, 1830 and 1848 as well as the Russian revolutions and many
other events.
Based on this information, we construct three di¤erent indicators of the threat
of revolution as perceived in country i in year t (TRkit). To understand how this is
done, let Rjt be the number of revolutionary events that took place in country j
in year t and let W kij be the spatial weight attached to the revolutionary event in
country i for country j where k 2 fu; g; lg is the index for a particular weight. The
indicators of the threat of revolution are then dened as:
TRkit =
X
j 6=i
W kijRjt: (9)
The rst indicator, k = u, is an unweighted sum of the number of revolutionary
events in each year, i.e., W uij = 1 for all i and j with i 6= j. The threat of
revolution hypothesis suggests, however, that the information content of events
is likely to be larger for events that happen in countries that are geographically,
economically, or culturally closer. Our two other indicators recognize this aspect
of the di¤usion process. The second indicator, k = g, uses geographical distance
23These are coded based on the works by Tilly (1993, 2004) and Todd (1998) and supplemented
with information from Encyclopaedia Britannica.
24All the events are detailed in Data Appendix B.
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to dene the weight and let W gij =
1
Dij
, where Dij is the distance in kilometers
between the capitals of the country pair. The third indicator, k = l, uses linguistic
distance to dene the weights and let W lij = 1 
p
15 #commonij
15
, where #commonij
is the number of common branches (up to 15) in the linguistic tree for each pair of
countries (Fearon, 2003). Arguably, sharing a common language and geographical
proximity are both plausible di¤usion channels. For the main analysis, we construct
each of the three indicators using the 16 major events, indicated in boldface in Table
1. In robustness checks, we make use of all 42 events. We exclude revolutionary
events within a country in all these calculations. The rationale for doing so is that
they represent the impulse to the di¤usion process but are not a consequence of it.
For these data to be useful for our proposed test, it must be true (1) that infor-
mation about these events spread around Europe fast, and (2) that the information
was, in fact, used by the governing classes and potential regime challengers in other
countries to assess the likelihood of a successful home-grown revolution. We discuss
each of these requirements before we proceed. Firstly, even in the early part of
the 19th century, news spread fast within Europe. Stuurman (1991), for example,
discusses how news of the French Revolution in 1848 reached Dutch merchants o¤
the coast of Africa within weeks and presumably long after the news was known
in the Netherlands. Likewise, English newspapers reported the July revolution in
Paris in 1830 on August 3 (Brock, 1973, p. 102). Later on in the century, with
the construction of telegraph lines, news from all corners of Europe could spread
quickly, not just amongst the European elites but also, as printed media and literacy
spread, amongst the general population.
Secondly, the historical record contains plenty of examples demonstrating that
the governing classes used information about revolutionary events abroad to assess
the threat of revolution at home and that opposition groups took inspiration from
events happening in neighboring countries. One example is the impact that the
July 1830 revolution in France had on the attitude of British Members of Parlia-
ment towards franchise reform. Some commentators at the time, in fact, suggested
that news of the July revolution triggered franchise reform in Britain by making the
governing classes aware of the threat of revolution (Halevy, 1935) and when Lord
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Grey introduced the reform bill to the House of Commons with the words, the
principal of my reform is to prevent the necessity of revolution[...] I am reforming
to preserve, not to overthrow, he made a clear reference to the perceived risk of vio-
lent social change. Another example is the impact that the European revolutions of
1848 had in Denmark and in the Netherlands. As Weyland (2010, p. 1162) puts it,
the Danish king in March 1848 had the opportunity to observe the daily advance of
revolution across Central Europe: he could almost predict the hour when it would
reach Copenhagen [....] On March 18, Frederic VII made hasty concession [includ-
ing a franchise reform] to the restless masses gathered outside his palace to avert an
explosion in Denmark. Along similar lines, Stuurman (1991, p. 464) summarizes
the situation in the Netherlands in 1848 as follows: although the Netherlands did
not experience anything like a violent revolution in 1848, the political events of that
year assuredly deviated from the normal course of Dutch politics [...] the fundamen-
tal cause of the non-violent revolution in the Netherlands is without doubt to be
found in the European revolutions, notably those in France, Germany and Austria.
Yet another example is the Russian Revolution in 1917 where heightened working-
class pressure [in Germany, Belgium, Sweden and Finland] was surely activated as
much by the Russian Revolution as by World War I. From the side of the working
class, what perhaps changed most was not the greater force of its pro-democratic
agitation, but the revolutionary rather than the democratic example of the Russian
Revolution(Collier, 1999, p. 78). Likewise, Weyland (2010) contends that fear of
bolshevism induced preemptive su¤rage reforms in Britain, Sweden, Germany, and
Finland in 1917-19. In all these examples, news about revolutions abroad informed
reform decisions reached by the elites across the continent, and it did so because it
served as a rally call and as inspiration for local revolutionaries.
<Table 1 to appear here>
4 Estimation Strategy
We use two di¤erent research designs to implement our test of the threat of rev-
olution hypothesis. In the rst design, the dependent variable is the continuous
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variable su¤rage and the baseline specication is a xed e¤ects panel model:
su¤rageit = su¤rageit 1 + 1TR
k
it +Xit + 'i + t + "it; (10)
where 'i is a country xed e¤ect, t is two-year time xed e¤ects and "it is an error
term with E ("it) = 0. The vector Xit includes other potential determinates of the
su¤rage. To control for the initialpolitical state, we include a lagged dependent
variable. The error terms "it are unlikely to satisfy the standard assumptions of
temporal and spatial independence and homoskedasticity. In the baseline speci-
cation, we, therefore, take account of i) cross-country spatial correlation amongst
the disturbances, ii) autocorrelation, and iii) panel heteroskedasticity. We adopt
the panel correction recommended by Beck and Katz (1995) to model unrestricted
spatial correlation and we cluster the error terms at the country level.25 These stan-
dard errors cannot be estimated with one-year time xed e¤ects because of the high
correlation between year e¤ects and the threat of revolution variables. This is the
reason why we include two-year time xed e¤ects in the baseline. In section 5.2.4,
we show that the results are robust to controlling for one-year time xed e¤ects
in specications where we do not model unrestricted spatial correlation. Theory
predicts that 1 is positive.
Our second research design is an event history model. Here, the objective is to
investigate whether the threat of revolution explains the timing of su¤rage reforms.
We code, using the information from column two in Table 1, the dependent variable
reformit as one if country i introduced a franchise extension in year t and as zero
in the years before and after that. A country drops out of the sample in the year
after it introduced universal male su¤rage or if it, before that happened, became a
dictatorship. We do not know precisely when a country became at riskof extending
the franchise. We deal with this problem of left censoring by assuming that countries
enter the risk seteither in 1820 or at the time of independence (as recorded in
column one of Table 1). As in Beck et al. (1998), we estimate the following discrete
25The measures of the threat of revolution are serially correlated by construction. This can, as
pointed out by Bertrand et al. (2004), generate spurious correlation. We use a parametric method
to correct for this. For each country, we use the estimated autocorrelation coe¢ cients from an
AR(1) process to adjust the standard errors. With more than 100 years of data, it is unlikely
that these coe¢ cients are biased downwards. The estimated autocorrelation coe¢ cients are small
(around 0.05). We use the PCSE procedure in STATA 12 to make these adjustments.
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logistic model
P
 
reformit = 1jTRkit; Xit;Mt 1 = 0

=
1
1 + e (1TR
k
it+Xit+H(:))
; (11)
whereXit is the vector of other potential determinates of the su¤rage. The indicator
variable Mt 1 is equal to zero in each year before universal male su¤rage and equal
to one thereafter. The function H (:) captures duration dependence in the hazard
rate.26 We cluster the standard errors at the country level. Theory predicts that
1 is positive.
The two research designs capture di¤erent aspects of the democratization process.
The panel model captures the evolution of the fraction of the population with vot-
ing rights, over time and space. The event history model captures the timing of
su¤rage reform. In both cases, identication requires the assumption of conditional
independence. We discuss how reasonable this assumption is and potential threats
to it below, but rst we introduce the co-variates (Xit). They are motivated by
theoretical considerations but necessarily constrained by data availability. In the
baseline, we only include variables for which we have data for the whole sample
period.27 In extensions, we add variables (to be introduced later) with partial time
coverage to address particular issues. Firstly, some co-variates are motivated by
the modernization hypothesis, initially formulated Lipset (1960). He stressed the
gradual increase in income and the improvement in education attainment as causes
of democratization. We capture modernization by GDP per capita and a dummy
variable, educational attainment, that is equal to one if enrollment in primary ed-
ucation is greater than 60 per cent and zero otherwise. The variable, urbanization
rate, also captures aspects of modernization. As stressed by Przeworski (2009), it
can, in addition, serve as a proxy for the demand for public goods and be used to
control for a positive association between the value of public goods and su¤rage
reform, as predicted by Lizzeri and Persico (2004).28 Secondly, Lopez-Cordova and
26The argument of the function H(:) is t   tpi ;where tpi represents either the year in which
country i enters the risk setor the year of the previous franchise extension within the sample
period. We estimate H (:) using natural cubic splines and use the estimated spline coe¢ cients
along with the cumulation of years since the last reform (or since entry to the sample) to model
duration dependence. Based on a sequence of F-tests, we use a specication with two knots.
27See Data Appendix C for precise denitions and sources.
28See also Llavador and Oxoby (2005).
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Meissner (2008) and others argue that trade integration causes democratization.
We capture this via the dummy variable, gold standard, that is equal to one if a
country is on the gold standard and zero otherwise. The idea is that being on
the gold standard reduces trade costs and indirectly encourages trade integration.29
Thirdly, we include a measure of the size of the population (population) to capture
scale e¤ects. All these variables are lagged by ve years to reduce the risk of si-
multaneity bias. Fourthly, Janowitz (1976) and, more recently, Ticchi and Vindigni
(2009) and Dincecco (2011) argue that mass conscription armies and war cause de-
mocratization. We use the dummy variable, war, that records whether a country
was at war in a given year to control for this. World War I was a major shock to
the European political and economic order. To capture this and to isolate the e¤ect
of the Russian Revolution of 1917 from the e¤ect of the war, we include a dummy
variable, WWI, that is equal to one for all countries during the period 1914-18.
5 Evidence From the Panel Model
We organize the evidence from the panel model in ve sub-sections. We begin
with the baseline results. In the next sub-section, we evaluate various sources
of bias. This includes a discussion of spatial correlation, the reection problem,
reverse causality, own revolutions, enlightenment shock (one-year time xed e¤ects),
and the e¤ect of the French revolution. This is followed by evidence on auxiliary
predictions from the theory and a discussion of other robustness checks. The nal
sub-section discusses alternative estimation techniques.
5.1 Baseline Results
Table 2 reports the baseline results. Columns one to three show the results for the
three di¤erent measures of the threat of revolution without any control variables
(except for the lagged endogenous variable and the xed e¤ects). The subsequent
three columns show the results with the vector of co-variates. In all specications,
the coe¢ cient on the threat of revolution proxy is positive and signicant at the
29The main virtue of this imperfect proxy is that, in contrast to the alternatives considered in
section 7, it can be coded for the entire sample period.
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ve percent level or better. Moreover, the parameter estimates are stable. Based on
the estimate reported in column four, the short-run e¤ect of an extra revolutionary
event somewhere in Europe is to increase the franchise by almost two percentage
points in the average country. The long-run e¤ect is around 30 percentage points.
This baseline result is consistent with the threat of revolution hypothesis.
This estimate represents a causal e¤ect only if the assumption of selection on
observables is satised. This assumption fails if countries which were ready to
democratize for reasons that we do not observe happened to be more exposed to
revolutionary shocks from abroad. It is not possible to formally test if this is the
case or not, but Altonji et al. (2005) propose a method which can give a sense of
how critical selection on unobservables is. The idea is to assume that selection on
unobservable factors is as important as selection on the observable factors included
in the regression model. Imposing this equal selection assumption enables us
explicitly to calculate the magnitude of the selection bias (bias). We can compare
this to the point estimate b1 obtained under the selection on observables assumption
(reported at the top of Table 2) and calculate what we shall call the selection-ratio
as
b1
bias
. The selection ratio tells us how much stronger selection on unobservables
than on observables needs to be for the OLS estimate (b1) to be attributable entirely
to selection bias. We report the estimated ratios in bottom row of Table 2.30 The
ratios range from 2.5 to 5.9. This means that selection on unobservables would have
to be 2.5-5.9 times stronger than selection on observables for the baseline result to
be entirely explained by selection bias. While perhaps not impossible, we nd this
highly implausible.
<Table 2: Baseline results>
5.2 Confounding Factors
In this section, we evaluate various sources of bias, discuss alternative interpre-
tations of the baseline result, and demonstrate the remarkable robustness of the
relationship between su¤rage and our measures of the threat of revolution.
30We thank Todd Elder for sharing the relevant STATA code with us.
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5.2.1 Spatial Dependence and the Reection Problem
The baseline specications adjust the standard errors for unrestricted spatial cor-
relation. An alternative, suggested by Conley (1999), is to use a notion of social
distance to model spatial dependence. In our context, the most natural notion is
geographical proximity. We capture this by the crow-y distance between pairs of
capital cities. Table 3 reports three specications with Conley-adjustedstandard
errors based on three di¤erent cut-o¤s for how far apart two countries must be for
the spatial correlation to fade to zero. Although the standard errors are higher, the
estimated coe¢ cient on TRgit remains signicant at least at the ve percent level.
Our emphasis on international di¤usion of information naturally brings the so-
called reection problem to mind. The reection problem refers to the fact that, in
general, it is hard to separate contextual e¤ects from social e¤ects (Manski, 1993).
This is often a serious obstacle to inference because the object of interest is the
size of the social e¤ect. We, however, do not pretend to be able to separate the
threatthat originates from being located in a geographical area which shares a
common threat (a contextual e¤ect) from the threatthat originates from the fact
that peersare threatened (a social e¤ect).
Yet, Proposition 3 of the model points to a particular form of reection which
we can model. The issue is this: revolutionary events in country 1 may trigger
a democratization in country 2. This democratization is observed in country 3
where the elite decide to imitate and also extend the franchise.31 This generates
an upwards bias in the estimate of 1 which then reects a combination of direct
and indirect e¤ects of the threat. To separate these e¤ects, we use the variable
su¤rage reforms abroad, dened as the number of su¤rage reforms happening in
other countries in the sample in a given year weighted by linguistic distance. If
the indirect e¤ect of revolutionary events abroad is important, we expect a positive
coe¢ cient on this variable and a reduction in the size of the estimated coe¢ cient
on TRgit. Table 3, column four shows that su¤rage reforms abroad is insignicant
and with the wrongsign. Moreover, the size of the estimated coe¢ cient on TRgit
31See also Gleditsch and Ward (2006) or Persson and Tabellini (2009).
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is una¤ected (1.21 versus 1.19).32 We obtain similar results with other denitions
of su¤rage reforms abroad.
We interpret the coe¢ cient on TRgit as evidence that the threat of revolution
a¤ects the franchise extension. It is, however, possible that revolutionary shocks
abroad simply reduce uncertainty surrounding the cost of reform at home. This
might inuence the balance of power within the elite itself and give reform-friendly
factions a competitive edge over reform opponents. We can use information on
su¤rage reform abroad to investigate this possibility. The idea is that if this hy-
pothesis is true, then both revolutionary shocks and the reform experience of other
countries should help reform-friendly factions of the elite and make su¤rage reform
more likely. As noted, we neither nd that the direct measure of a favorable re-
form environment su¤rage reforms abroad is signicant, nor that it has any
substantive impact on the coe¢ cient on TRgit.
<Table 3 to appear here>
5.2.2 Reverse Causality
Su¤rage reform in some country may inspire demands for democracy in neighboring
countries but with the consequence that the situation gets out of hand and a rev-
olutionary event is triggered. If so, the causality may run from su¤rage reform to
revolution rather than the other way. We evaluate the plausibility of this alternative
interpretation in two ways. First, we introduce a one-year lag in the measures of
the revolutionary threat. Table 3, column ve shows a representative specication.
The point estimate on TRgit 1 is 1:02 as compared to 1:19 in the baseline, and is
signicant at the ve percent level. A general concern with using one-year lags as a
defence against reverse causality is that the residuals might exhibit autocorrelation.
In practice, however, the estimated autocorrelation parameter in the error structure
in the baseline specication in Table 2, column ve is very low (around 0:05) and we
explicitly model country-specic AR(1) processes in the error terms. Yet, we con-
sider two alternative ways to engage further with the threat to revolving the reverse
32When we add su¤rage reforms abroad to the event history models discussed in Section 6, we
obtain a positive and signicant coe¢ cient. The estimated coe¢ cient on TRgit remains positive
and statistically signicant but is smaller.
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causality problem with a timing restriction. The rst alternative is to model the
change in the franchise extension (su¤rage) rather than its level (su¤rage). The
point is that specications with su¤rage are less prone to autocorrelation in the
error structure.33 Table 3, column seven reports that the estimated coe¢ cient on
TRgit 1 is 1:26 and signicant at the one percent level in a regression with su¤rage
as the dependent variable. The second alternative is to estimate an event history
model. This is discussed in detail in Section 6. An event study model uses infor-
mation on the timing of the reforms only. In our data, these reforms are spread
out over time within a country and never occur in consecutive years in any country.
This reduces the problem of autocorrelation. It is reassuring that the point estimate
on TRgit 1 is also positive and signicant in these models (see Table 8 in Section 6).
Second, the frequency of our data is yearly. Revolutionary events and su¤rage
reforms happening in the same year are, therefore, coded as if they were simulta-
neous events. In reality, of course, they were not and it is instructive to look at
the timing within a year. Table 4 shows for each of the years associated with a
major revolutionary event, the date of the onset of the event or events (column
two) and the date at which the su¤rage concession was announced in the a¤ected
countries (column three). In some cases, the reforms were announced or conceded
the year before they were actually adopted (which are the years recorded in Table 1
and repeated in bracket in Table 4). An example of this is Denmark in 1848 where
the Danish King announced his willingness to broaden the franchise on March 18
1848, but the new constitution was not signed till June 5 1849. Another example
is United Kingdom in 1918. The process that led to the fourth reform act arguably
started in 1912 with the proposed Franchise and Distribution Act.
For the three rst waves in 1820, 1830 and 1848, we observe that revolutionary
events systematically preceded the su¤rage reforms. The only exception is Switzer-
land. Here, the constitutional process triggered by the civil war of 1847 started
before the revolution in France but can hardly be considered the cause of the 1848
revolutions.34 The Russian revolution of 1905 preceded the reform process in Fin-
33The estimated autocorrelation parameter is 0.005 with two-year xed e¤ects and 0.0028 with
one-year e¤ects.
34Berger and Spoerer (2001, p. 320) conclude that without the economic crisis of 1845-1848,
..., there would not have been the critical mass to support these new ideas and thus attribute
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land. The timing in the turbulent years around World War I is a little less clear-cut,
but the reforms in the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Italy and Belgium clearly fol-
lowed after the Russian revolution of 1917 and the revolution in Hungary in 1918.
The constitutional reform in Germany  leading to the Weimar Republic  also
follows after the two major revolutionary events. Based on the evidence recorded
in Table 4 and on the detailed narrative provided by Weyland (2010), we nd it
implausible that the baseline result is due to reverse causality. The timing and
historical narrative are simply not consistent with this.
<Table 4 to appear here>
5.2.3 Own Revolutions
Our coding of the threat revolution variables exclude revolutionary events that
happened within a country. The reason for not doing so is that we are using the
di¤usion of information about revolutions that happened elsewhere to estimate the
impact of the threat of revolution. Revolutions that actually happened within a
country is an impulse to the process not a consequence of it. In practice, it is only
France who had own revolutionswithin the Western European sample. An objec-
tion to our choice of excluding these events is that we are confounding revolutions
in France with revolutions elsewhere. We can deal with this by controlling directly
for own revolutionsin the regressions. Table 3, column six reports a specication
where we add the dummy variable own revolution which is equal to one for France
in 1830 and 1848. We observe that the coe¢ cient on TRgit is largely una¤ected. The
French revolutions of 1830 and 1848 themselves were related to franchise extensions
in France and so the coe¢ cient on own revolution is positive and signicant. In
conclusion, we can rule out that the baseline results are driven by our coding of the
revolution variables.
5.2.4 Enlightenment Shocks
It is possible that revolution and su¤rage reform were both driven by liberal ideas
sweeping the continent, and our results could be interpreted as evidence of such
the 1848 revolution to economic shocks.
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simultaneous over-time change in the revolutionary mood and franchise extension
caused by enlightenment shocks. The publication of important books, such as
Alexis de Tocquevilles Democracy in America from 1835, von Humboldts The
Limits of State Action from 1851, John Stuart Mills On Liberty from 1859, or Karl
Marx and Friedrich EngelsManifesto of the Communist Party from 1848, could,
for example, induce such spurs of enlightenment.
All the baseline specications include time xed e¤ects to control for common
enlightenment shocks at the two-year frequency but it is, of course, possible that
these shocks happened at the yearly frequency.35 The reason for using two-year
time xed e¤ects is that doing so enables us to estimate panel corrected standard
errors with unrestricted spatial correlation. We cannot model unrestricted spatial
correlation in the error structure if we include one-year time xed e¤ects. The
problem is multicollinearity: one-year time and country xed e¤ects can explain 98
percent of the variation in the unweighted proxy for the threat of revolution (TRuit)
and 87 percent of the variation in the distance weighted measure (TRgit). Since we
do not include one-year time xed e¤ects in our baseline models, we may not be
controlling adequately for enlightenment shocks.
To gauge whether this is the case or not, we carry out additional estimations and
tests. Firstly, we demonstrate that the results obtained with the distance weighted
proxy for the threat of revolution (TRgit) are robust to including one-year time xed
e¤ects. As noted, we cannot obtain standard errors that correct for unrestricted
spatial correlation in this case. We can, however, obtain both clustered standard
errors corrected for panel heteroscedasticity and Conley-adjusted standard errors
which use crow-y distance between capital cities to model spatial dependency.
Table 5 reports two sets of results.36 Columns 1 to 3 show, for ease of comparison,
35In Data Appendix D in the supplementary material, we show that the baseline results are
una¤ected if we cluster the standard errors by year (or by two-year pairs).
36The models reported in Table 5 control for the variable own revolution. We include this
variable for two reasons. First, we show in Table 3, column six that the variable is highly signicant.
Second, it is arguably more important to control for own revolution with one-year than with two-
year time xed e¤ects. Table 4 demonstrates that France had ownrevolutions in 1830 and 1848
which led to subsequent franchise extensions. If we do not control for these, they will be absorbed
by the one-year time xed e¤ects. This overestimates the importance of these time xed e¤ects,
and makes it harder to distinguish them from TRgit or TR
g
it 1. As expected, we obtain smaller
coe¢ cient estimates on the threat of revolution variables if we exclude own revolution. Precision
is also reduced, but the point estimates on TRgit 1 remains statistically signicant at the ve
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estimations that control for two-year time xed e¤ect e¤ects. Columns four to six
show estimations that control for one-year time xed e¤ects. Column four shows
that the point estimate on TRgit is equal to 1:03 and signicant at the 10 percent
level. This is a little smaller and less precisely estimated than with two-year e¤ects
(reported in column one). Column ve shows a specication with a one-year lag of
TRgit. The estimated coe¢ cient on TR
g
it 1 is equal to 1:10 and signicant at the ve
percent level. Column six reports on a specication where the outcome variable is
su¤rage. In this rst di¤erence model, the estimated coe¢ cient on TRgit 1 is 1:37
and signicant at the one percent level. In both cases, the point estimate is slightly
smaller than the one obtained with two-year year xed e¤ects.
Secondly, a classic solution to a multicollinearity problem is to expand the sam-
ple. We cannot do this for the panel model that uses su¤rage as the outcome
variable. It is, however, possible to expand the sample in the context of the event
history study where we use the dummy reform as the outcome variable. As dis-
cussed in Section 6.2 in more detail, in that framework, we can estimate a linear
probability model which includes two-way xed e¤ects, with time xed e¤ects de-
ned at the yearly frequency, for the extended sample of 17-21 countries. We nd
that the estimated coe¢ cient on TRgit is positive and signicant at the ten percent
level evaluated with standard errors that allow for unrestricted spatial correlation.
Moreover, the coe¢ cient is similar to the one obtained without one-year time dum-
mies. This suggests that we are not merely capturing enlightenment shocks with
the threat of revolution proxies.
Thirdly, another way to deal with multicollinearity is to increase cross-sectional
variation in the data. In Section 5.3, we test two auxiliary hypotheses generated
by the threat of revolution hypothesis. Both of them induce more cross-sectional
variation in the threat of revolution proxies by introducing interactions, either by
postulating that the revolutionary events are likely to have stronger e¤ects on coun-
tries that are close to where the event takes place or by postulating that the threat
of revolution is conditional on inequality. Both hypotheses receive support with
one-year xed e¤ects.
percent level.
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Taken together these estimations do not suggest that the baseline results from
Table 2 simply capture yearly time shocks and demonstrate that our results are
robust to yearly enlightenment shocks. The one-year time xed e¤ects are, however,
an inadequate defense against country-specic time varying enlightenment shocks.
To capture such shocks, we draw on the work of Potrafke and Vaubel (2011) on
European authors of liberty. Authors of libertyare scholars, poets, journalists,
politicians, civil servants, etc. who during their life-time were inuential supporters
of liberal or radical ideas. Examples include Stefan Zweig, John Stuart Mill, Victor
Hugo, MaxWeber, Jakob Mey, and 366 others selected by a panel of country experts
and listed in the Appendix to Potrafke and Vaubel (2011). Based on these data,
we construct two country-specic time-varying enlightenment indicators. The rst,
ALHomeit , records the number of authors of libertywho live in country i in year t.
The second, ALAbroadit , records the number of such authors from country i who live
abroad (often because they emigrated in response to repression at home) in year t,
both measured per 1000 inhabitants. We conjecture that these authors of liberty
serve as exponents of liberal ideas at home and, if living abroad, that they provide
a hub through which new liberal ideas developing abroad can be transmitted to
liberal-minded connections in their home country. Re-estimating the panel model
with ALHomeit and AL
Abroad
it added, we nd that
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su¤rageit = 0:94
(0:014)
su¤rageit 1 + ::+ 1:32
(0:18)
TRgit + ::+ 1:20
(0:98)
ALAbroadit + 0:46
(1:58)
ALHomeit + ::
(12)
The coe¢ cients on the two enlightenment indicators are positive, as expected, but
not statistically signicant. More importantly, the coe¢ cient on TRgit continues
to be highly signicant and is a little larger than previously. All in all, we nd
it unlikely that the positive baseline estimate of 1 simply reects confounding
enlightenment shocks. Enlightenment might have been part of the story, but so
was the threat of revolution.
<Table 5 to appear here>
37The (unreported) control variables are the same as in Table 2, column ve. The standard
errors reported in brackets under the coe¢ cients allow for unrestricted spatial correlation, within
country clustering, and panel heteroskedasticity.
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5.2.5 The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars
In the years after 1792, the French army occupied a number of neighboring countries
(or parts thereof) and imposed the French civil code and eliminated aristocratic
privileges (Acemoglu et al. 2011). This attempt to exportthe French revolution
by force might have lingered in the backs of the minds of the European elites in
the decades that followed. They might, therefore, have reacted to the revolutionary
events in France (and elsewhere) in 1830 and 1848, not out of fear that they too
were at risk of a revolution, but because they feared another attempt at exporting
revolutionary ideas by force. If so, the positive correlation between the threat of
revolution proxies and su¤rage reform could reect an attempt by the elites in other
countries to di¤use such a threat by copying the political system of the country
where the revolution originated. This alternative explanation, however, presumes
that such a move would e¤ectively preempt an invasion. This would only be the
case if the main objective of such an invasion was to export revolutionary ideas and
institutions. This appears implausible and, moreover, this alternative interpretation
is not consistent with the interaction between inequality and the threat of revolution
proxies reported below in Section 5.3.
5.2.6 Repression, Transfers and Business Cycle Shocks
The threat of revolution hypothesisviews repression or the promise of transfers
as alternative ways to deal with the threat of revolution (see e.g. Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2000, 2006). Logically, therefore, repression and transfers are negatively
correlated with the franchise extension but positively correlated with the threat of
revolution. Consequently, the estimate of 1 is biased downwards. The reason we
do not correct for this bias in the baseline is data limitations. We can, however, at
the cost of reducing the sample size obtain some rudimentary proxies for repression
and transfers. As a proxy for repression, we use the share of the public budget
spent on policing and defense (repression) and as a measure of scal transfers,
we use the share of the public budget spent on health, education, housing and
various government-sponsored insurance and welfare programs (scal transfers).
Table 6, columns one and two report some estimations that control for these factors.
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Despite the loss of observations, the threat of revolution variable continues to have
a signicant and positive e¤ect on su¤rage. The point estimates on repression
and scal transfers are negative, as predicted by the theory, but not statistically
signicant.38
Economic hardship is likely to be negatively correlated with revolutionary threats.
Insofar as the business cycle has an international component, this may also bias the
estimate of 1 downwards. To evaluate the importance of this, we extract the cycli-
cal component of GDP per capita, cycle, using a Hodrick-Prescott lter. Column
three of Table 6 reports a specication with cycle and the trend component of GDP
per capita, trend. The point estimate on TRgit is smaller, as one would expect if
the cycle is negatively correlated with the threat of revolution and positively corre-
lated across countries, but its signicance is una¤ected. The e¤ect of cycle itself is
insignicant. It is, however, questionably if the quality of the historical GDP data
is su¢ cient to capture the business cycle element accurately. The problem is that
the GDP data for the period is often constructed using incomplete data for subsets
of sectors and years. An alternative proxy for the cycle is to use year-on-year vari-
ation in rainfall. This has been shown by, for example, Berger and Spoerer (2001),
Miguel et al. (2004), Brückner and Ciccone (2011), Burke and Leigh (2010) and
Franck (2014) to be a good predictor of economic activity in economies with a large
agricultural sector and to predict social unrest in Aidt and Leon (2014). Using data
from Casty et al. (2007), we code two variables, rainfall, and rainfall growth. They
measure the logarithm of the yearly rainfall and the year-on-year change in rainfall.
We focus on the period before World War I since the Western European economies
were more agrarian then. In column four of Table 6, we include the contempora-
neous and the lagged value of rainfall as in Brückner and Ciccone (2011), while in
column ve, we follow Miguel et al. (2004) and use rainfall growth and its lagged
value. The coe¢ cients on the rainfall variables are positive, but not statistically
signicant. The estimated e¤ect of the threat of revolution is hardly a¤ected.
38Re-estimating the specications without repression and scal transfers on the restricted sam-
ple makes almost no di¤erence to the point estimate on TRgit. This suggests that the downward
bias is small. It makes no di¤erence to the results if we control for repression and scal transfers
abroad in the estimations [not reported].
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<Table 6 to appear here>
5.3 Tests of Auxiliary Hypotheses
The threat of revolution hypothesisdelivers two auxiliary predictions that we test.
Firstly, information about revolutionary threats di¤use across borders and agents
in other countries learn about the risks and opportunities at home from events hap-
pening abroad. This learning e¤ect is likely to be stronger amongst pairs of coun-
tries which are geographically, economically, or culturally closer. By distinguishing
common time variation in the threat of revolution from cross-country variation gen-
erated by di¤erences in geographical or linguistic distance to the epicenter of each
revolutionary event, we can test this prediction.39 Specically, we decompose the
threat measure as follows:
gTRgit = e1X
j 6=i
Rjt + eX
j 6=i
DijRjt: (13)
The rst term captures over-time variation in the threat level that is common to all
countries and we expect that e1 > 0. The second term isolates the cross-country
variation generated by di¤erences in distance to the events. This source of variation
is plausibly exogenous and we expect that e < 0. Re-estimating the panel model
withgTRgit instead of TRgit, we nd that in a specication with two-year time xed
e¤ects40
suffrageit = 0:93
(0:013)
su¤rageit 1 + ::+ 3:38
(0:49)
X
j 6=i
Rjt   0:0019
(0:0005)
X
j 6=i
DijRjt + :::. (14)
The estimate of e, which is identied purely from the cross-country variation gener-
ated by distance to the revolutionary events, is negative and statistically signicant.
This suggests that the revolutionary shocks had a larger e¤ect in countries closer
to the epicenter of each event. Moreover, we have re-estimated this specication
with one-year time xed e¤ects.41 The estimate of e is equal to  0:0035 and is
39Cross-country variation is also created by the fact that we omit revolutionary events happening
within a country itself. This variation is non-random. Since this only a¤ects France (in 1830 and
1848), we check that excluding France makes no di¤erence to the results [not reported]. We also
note that the results are robust to controlling for the variable own revolution (see Table 3, column
six).
40The (unreported) control variables are the same as in Table 2, column ve. The standard
errors reported in brackets under the coe¢ cients allow for unrestricted spatial correlation, within
country clustering, and panel heteroskedasticity.
41With one-year time xed e¤ects, we cannot identify e1:
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statistically signicant.
Secondly, the threat of revolution hypothesispredicts that the elites are more
inclined to seek alternatives to franchise extension when they consider democrati-
zation threatening. Democratization is arguably more threatening where inequality
is high because this enhances the incentive of newly enfranchised voters to sup-
port state-sponsored redistribution. Reliable historical data on income inequality is
scarce. However, from the work by Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002), we obtain
data on the gini coe¢ cient for a subset of countries. We test this auxiliary hypoth-
esis by adding the gini coe¢ cient, gini, and the interaction between gini and TRgit
to the model. This creates additional cross sectional variation in the e¤ect of TRgit
and allows us to include one-year time xed e¤ects. The result is:42
su¤rageit = 0:93
(0:013)
su¤rageit 1+::+15:95
(5:73)
TRgit+::+40:15
(27:10)
giniit 5 29:96
(10:91)
(giniit 5TRgit)+::
(15)
The negative and statistically signicant coe¢ cient on the interaction term suggests
that as a countrys income distribution becomes less unequal, the elites become
more willing to respond to the threat of revolution by extending the franchise.
The coe¢ cient on gini is not statistically signicant.43 The two auxiliary tests are
consistent with our interpretation of the baseline result as evidence in favor of the
threat of revolution hypothesis.
5.4 Other Robustness Checks
Table 5 reports the results from three additional robustness checks.44 First, the
baseline specication uses the sub-set of major revolutionary events recorded in
boldface in Table 1. In column six, we report a representative specication that
uses all the recorded events. The coe¢ cient of TRgit is smaller, but continues to
42The (unreported) control variables are the same as in Table 2, column ve. The standard
errors reported in brackets under the coe¢ cients allow for within country clustering, and panel
heteroskedasticity. There is not su¢ cient cross section variation to allow for unrestricted spatial
correlation in the error structure, but using the Conley-adjusted standard errors yield similar
results. We obtain similar results with the other proxies [not reported].
43Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Boix (2003), and Ansell and Samuels (2010) stress that
inequality may a¤ect the franchise, although there is no agreement on the nature of the e¤ect.
The observed range for gini is 0.47 to 0.56. For the average value of gini (0.52) the (short-run)
marginal e¤ect of TRg on su¤rage is around 1.38.
44Appendix D in the supplementary material contains more robustness checks.
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be signicant at the one percent level. This is not surprising since the minor rev-
olutionary events are associated with less informative signals. Second, the wave
of reforms between 1915 and 1919, arguably, were di¤erent from those happening
during the long 19th century. To check that the results are not inuenced unduly by
this, we report in column seven, a specication where we restrict the sample to the
period from 1820 to 1913. This makes almost no di¤erence. Third, Italy, Austria
and Germany drop out of the sample when they become dictatorships during the
interwar years. In column eight, we show a specication where we keep Italy and
Germany until 1938.45 This has almost no e¤ect on the point estimate.
5.5 Alternative Estimation Techniques
In the baseline specications, we adopt an OLS estimator and adjust the standard
errors to take unrestricted spatial correlation, within country interdependency (clus-
tering by country), and panel heteroskedasticity into account. In Table 7, we report
results obtained by alternative estimation techniques. Firstly, to get a sense of how
much the adjustment for spatial correlation and clustering in the error structure
matters, we report in columns one to three specications which do not correct for
spatial correlation or for clustering (column one), correct for spatial correlation, but
not for clustering (column two), or corrects for clustering but not for spatial corre-
lation (column three), respectively.46 Clustering by country has little e¤ect on the
standard errors. In contrast, modeling spatial correlation improves precision. In all
cases, the point estimate on TRgit (which is not a¤ected by the various adjustments)
is statistically signicant at the one percent level.
Secondly, we are aware that the lagged dependent variable may cause a Nick-
ell bias, albeit with more than 100 years of data the bias is likely to be small.47
The GMM-system estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) or the bias-corrected least-
squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator (Bruno, 2005) can correct this bias, if
there is one.48 Very similar results emerge with these estimators (columns three
45Su¤rage is equal to zero during years with dictatorship. Austria is not included post-1918
due to incomplete urbanization data. Results are similar when urbanization rate is excluded and
Austria is included till 1938 [not reported].
46All estimations include country and two-year time xed e¤ects and allow for heteroskedasticity.
47Judson and Owen (1999) show that the bias is negligible with more than 20 years.
48With only 12 countries, the advantage of the GMM estimator is unclear.
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and four).
Thirdly, since all countries in the Western European sample, with the exception
of the United Kingdom and France, did not have regular elections by 1820 (su¤rage
is coded zero) and all countries had universal male su¤rage towards the end of the
sample period (su¤rage is coded 100), su¤rage is a censored outcome variable. We
can use the Tobit estimator or the fractional estimator, suggested by Papke and
Wooldridge (1996) to take this into account. From the results reported in columns
ve and six of Table 7, we see that it does not make any di¤erence to the signicance
of the results.
Finally, su¤rage as well as several of the control variables are trending up and
may be non-stationary. We have reformulated the model as an Error Correction
Model and nd similar results (reported in Appendix D).
<Table 7 to appear here>.
6 Evidence From the Event History Model
The panel model tests whether the threat of revolution a¤ected the degree of democ-
racy. The event history model tests whether the threat of revolution can explain
the timing of su¤rage reform.
6.1 The Western European Sample
Table 8 reports logit estimates of the e¤ect of the threat of revolution variables on
the probability of su¤rage reform. We observe that the estimates are positive and
statistically signicant at the one percent level (columns one to three). A similar
result is obtain with the one-year lag of TRgit (column four). Based on the estimate
reported in column one, one extra revolutionary event increases the odds that a
country will introduce a major su¤rage reform in that year by 75 percent. This is
a substantial e¤ect which is consistent with the threat of revolution hypothesis.
The specication in column ve shows that su¤rage reforms in neighboring countries
have a positive and signicant e¤ect on the probability of su¤rage reform in a given
country. This is also consistent with the prediction of the theory (proposition 3).
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As expected, controlling for this indirect channel reduces the point estimate on TRgit
but not its statistical signicance.
We have undertaken many robustness checks. Firstly, su¤rage reforms are rare
events. To correct for this, we have re-estimated all specications using the rare
events logit estimator (King and Zeng, 2001). The representative result reported
in column six shows that the coe¢ cient on TRgit continues to be statistically sig-
nicant at the one percent level after the bias-correction and that the coe¢ cient
estimate is only marginally smaller. Secondly, we treat all franchise extensions as
if they were nonreversible. We know that in some cases they were not. Using the
coding of franchise contractions from column four of Table 1, we make a distinction
between those reforms that lasted for at least ten years and those which were wholly
or partly reversed within that time window. Column seven shows a specication
that excludes su¤rage extensions that were followed by a franchise contraction. The
coe¢ cient on TRgit is smaller, but continues to be statistically signicant at the one
percent level. Thirdly, column eight shows a specication with country-specic haz-
ard rates.49 The point estimate is larger than the corresponding estimate reported
in column two and is signicant at the one percent level. Finally, we have investi-
gated specications that control for the cyclic component of GDP, or spending on
repression and scal transfers. In all cases, the estimate of the threat of revolution
variable is signicant.50
<Table 8 to appear here>
6.2 The Broader European Sample
All the countries in the Western European sampleachieved universal manhood suf-
frage within the sample period. In other parts of Europe, in particular in Eastern
Europe, on the Balkans, and on the Iberian peninsula, the evolution of democracy
was more sporadic and many countries did not become fully consolidated democ-
racies until the 1990s. Yet, they did take the rst steps towards democracy by
extending the franchise to broader segments of the populations before World War
49These are estimated by conditional xed e¤ects logit. Results from a random e¤ects model
are similar [not reported].
50See Table D1 in Appendix D included with the supplementary material.
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I or just after, following a pattern not all that dissimilar to the one followed in
Western Europe (Seymour and Frary, 1918). Consequently, seen from the perspec-
tive of the 19th century, it is not so clear that our sample of Western European
countries is systematically di¤erent from the fullEuropean sample. Nevertheless,
it is important to test the threat of revolution hypothesison a broader sample.
To this end, we add information on su¤rage reforms in Spain, Portugal, Greece,
Iceland, Luxembourg, Serbia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Romania to the sam-
ple. The down-side is that we can, due to data limitations, only control for the
inuence of war (war and WW1 ), and, in a few countries, for GDP per capita and
population. Table 9 reports the results for the maximum sample of 21 countries
(columns one to four). The last four columns report specications with additional
control variables, but fewer countries and less time coverage. We observe that the
threat of revolution (measured by TRgit) has a positive impact on the likelihood of
su¤rage reform. Moreover, it is evident that the signicance and magnitude of the
e¤ect is independent of the estimation technique and coding choices. The historical
narrative clearly demonstrates that repression was common currency in Russia and
Eastern Europe. Since we cannot control for this, we expect a downwards bias. It
is, therefore, not surprising that the estimated e¤ects are smaller in magnitude than
those reported for the Western European samplein Table 7.
<Table 9 to appear here>
As discussed in Section 5.2.4, TRgit and the other measures of the threat of
revolution are highly correlated with one-year time xed e¤ects. With the broader
European sample, we have up to 21 countries. The extra countries makes it feasible
to overcome the multicollinearity problem.51 In particular, we estimate a linear
probability model with country and one-year time xed e¤ects as well as unrestricted
spatial correlation in the error structure. The result is:52
51One-year dummies and country xed e¤ects now explain 80 percent of the variation in TRgit
in the enlarged sample. They explain 98 percent of the variation in the TRuit making estimation
infeasible with this proxy.
52The standard errors reported in brackets under the coe¢ cients allow for unrestricted spatial
correlation, within country clustering, and panel heteroskedasticity.
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P (reformit = 1jTRgit; Xit;Mt 1 = 0) = :::: 0:032
(0:01675)
TRgit + 0:0137
(0:035)
warit (16)
The coe¢ cient on TRgit is signicant at the ten percent level. While the year
dummies are signicant, they do not seem to matter much for the point estimate
which is 0:028 when the year dummies are excluded. We also note that we get
similar results when we control for GDP per capita and population. To reiterate,
these results reinforce our interpretation of the baseline results as evidence of threat
of revolution rather than of enlightenment shocks.
7 Other Results
Our regressions include a number of control variables motivated by other theories
of su¤rage reform than the threat of revolution hypothesis. We stress that our
study is not designed explicitly to test these alternatives. The purpose of including
these variables is to avoid confounding our estimate of threat of revolution e¤ect
in obvious ways. Yet, it is of independent interest to consider the ndings related
to these variables and to dig a little deeper by augmenting the baseline models
estimated on the Western European samplewith additional variables for which we
only got partial time or country coverage. Table 10 combines the additional results
from the panel model and the event history study.
In the baseline specications, we use the variable gold standard to proxy for
trade integration and we nd little support for the trade-causes-democracythesis.
The two variables trade volume (the sum of imports and exports relative to GDP)
and wheat price spread capture trade integration more directly.53 The variable
wheat price spread is a measure of trade costs based on convergence in wheat prices
across time and space (Jacks, 2005). The coe¢ cient on trade volume is positive,
but not signicant (column one and ve). On the other hand, wheat price spread
is signicant in the event history model (column six). This gives some credence to
the trade-causes-democracythesis.
The modernization variablesGDP per capita, urbanization rate, and education
53We lose between 200 and 650 observations when we include these variables.
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attainmentare mostly insignicant, with the exception that GDP per capita is sig-
nicant in the event history model (see Table 8). The same message comes from
the specications shown in columns three and seven of Table 10 where we control
for the impact of industrialization (agricultural share). This echoes the ndings
of Acemoglu et al. (2008) that rising income and education levels cannot explain
democratization.54 Occasionally, population size has a positive and signicant im-
pact.
The Janowitz thesisthat war in general and conscription armies in particular
were important impulses for democratic reform receives some support. In the panel
model, the coe¢ cient on war is consistently positive and signicant. Based on the
point estimates reported in Table 2, being at war increases su¤rage by between 3.2
and 4.3 percentage points in the short run, with the long-run e¤ect being about
17 times larger. The e¤ect is, however, not signicant in the event history study
(see, e.g., Table 8). To take the scale of war into account, we use a measure of
the number of war deathswar intensity. We obtain results that are qualitatively
similar to those obtained with the dummy variable war (columns four and eight of
Table 10). The dummy variable for World War I is not signicant, except in the
conditional xed e¤ects logit model reported in Table 8, column eight.
<Table 10 to appear here>
8 Conclusion
We provide robust econometric evidence that the threat of revolution was system-
atically related to the evolution of su¤rage rights in Europe in the 19th and early
20th centuries. This is consistent with the threat of revolution hypothesisand
the framework for understanding democracy change developed by Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000, 2006).
Yet, it is important to keep three points in mind. Firstly, by focusing on Europe
during the rst wave of democratization, we study a subset of the universe of all
su¤rage reforms. It is, therefore, possible that the threat of revolution played a
54For evidence supporting modernization theory, see, e.g., Gundlach and Paldam (2009) and
for a critical evaluation, see Przeworski and Limongi (1997).
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di¤erent role for democratization elsewhere and that other theories might have
greater explanatory power in other contexts, regions, or time periods. The work by
Przeworski (2009) on the causes of su¤rage reforms after World War I, the work
by Aidt and Franck (2013, 2014) on the relationship between the Swing riots and
support for the Great Reform Act in 1832 in Great Britain, and the work by Aidt
and Leon (2014) on the causal relationship between economic shocks, riots and
democratic change in Africa at the turn of the 20th century, however, give some
reason to believe that the threat of revolution hypothesiso¤ers insights into the
causes of su¤rage reforms also outside our sample and for particular reforms inside
our sample.
Secondly, Acemoglu and Robinsons (2000, 2006) theory of democratization em-
phasizes that democratization happens at critical junctures in history. Our evi-
dence support this interpretation. However, this does not rule out that complex
interactions between underlying, slow-moving economic variablesindustrialization,
urbanization, income growth, international trade, inequality, etc.and democratic
triggers could be important, and nor does the theory rule this out. One can inter-
pret the revolutions abroad as shocks that may push a country over a threshold,
but only if the underlying fundamentals are such that the economy is closeto the
threshold to begin with.
Third, we interpret revolutionary chocks as signals to the elites in other countries
about the threat of revolution. It is, however, possible that revolutions abroad
also capture signals about the cost of reform to factions within a divided elite.
Revolutions abroad might give those in favor of reform, a bargaining chip vis-à-vis
the reform opposition because they can threaten to encourage a domestic revolt
or simply because they can bullyopponents within the elite into action with an
argument that reform is needed to avoid a revolution. In this case, the relationship
between franchise extension and the threat of revolution variables does not capture
a direct threat e¤ect. Instead, it captures an indirect threat e¤ect through which
the hand of reform-friendly factions within the elite is strengthened. Su¤rage reform
is then caused by a mixture of preemptive and proactive forces.
40
References
[1] Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A., 2000. Why did the west extend the franchise?
Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 115, 1167-1199.
[2] Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A., 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
[3] Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A., 2001. The colonial origins of com-
parative development: an empirical investigation. American Economic Review
91, 1369-1401.
[4] Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A., Yared, P., 2008. Income and
democracy. American Economic Review 98(3), 808-842.
[5] Acemoglu, D., Cantoni, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A., 2011. The conse-
quences of radical reform: the French Revolution. American Economic Review
101, 3286-3307.
[6] Aidt, T.S., Daunton, M., Dutta, J., 2010. The Retrenchment hypothesis and
the extension of the franchise in England and Wales. Economic Journal 120,
990-1020.
[7] Aidt, T.S., Albornoz, F., 2011. An economic theory of political institutions:
foreign intervention and overseas investments. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics 94, 192-201.
[8] Aidt, T.S., Franck, R., 2013. How to get the snowball rolling and extend the
franchise: Voting on the Great Reform Act of 1832. Public Choice 155, 229-250.
[9] Aidt, T.S., Leon, G., 2014. The democratic window of opportunity: evidence
from riots in sub-Saharan Africa. Journal of Conict Resolution. In Press.
[10] Aidt, T.S., Franck, R., 2014. Democratization under the threat of revolution:
evidence from the Great Reform Act of 1832. Mimeo, Faculty of Economics,
University of Cambridge, UK.
[11] Altonji, J., Todd, G., Elder, E., Taber, C.R., 2005. Selection on observed and
unobserved variables: assessing the e¤ectiveness of Catholic Schools. Journal
of Political Economy 113, 151-184.
[12] Andrews, J.T., Jackson, R.W., 2005. Strategic fools: electoral rule choice under
extreme uncertainty. Electoral Studies 24, 65-84.
[13] Ansell, B., Samuels, D., 2010. Inequality and democratization: a contractarian
Approach. Comparative Political Studies 43, 1543-1574.
[14] Beck, N., Katz, J.N., 1995. What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-
section data. American Political Science Review 89, 634-647.
[15] Beck, N., Katz, J.N., Tucker, R., 1998. Taking time seriously: time-series-
cross-section analysis with a binary dependent variable. American Journal of
Political Science 42, 1260-1288.
[16] Berger, H., Spoerer, M., 2001. Economic crisis and the European revolutions
of 1848. Journal of Economic History 61, 293-326.
41
[17] Bertrand, M., Duo, E., Mullainathan, S., 2004. How much should we trust
di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 249-
275.
[18] Blundell, R., Bond, S., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in
dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics 87, 115-143.
[19] Boix, C., 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK.
[20] Bourguignon, F., Morrisson, C., 2002. Inequality among world citizens 1820-
1992. American Economic Review 92, 727-744.
[21] Brock, M., 1973. The Great Reform Act. Hutchinson University Library, Lon-
don.
[22] Bruno, G.S.F., 2005. Estimation and inference in dynamic unbalanced panel-
data models with a small number of individuals. The Stata Journal 5, 473-500.
[23] Brückner, M., Ciccone, A., 2011. Rain and the democratic window of oppor-
tunity. Econometrica 79, 923-947.
[24] Burke, P., Leigh, A., 2010. Do output contractions trigger democratic change?
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2, 124157.
[25] Casty, C., Raible, C.C., Stocker, T.F., Wanner, H., Luterbacher, J., 2007. A
European pattern climatology 17662000. Journal Climate Dynamics 29, 791-
805.
[26] Chaney, E., 2013. Revolt on the Nile: economic shocks, religion and political
power. Econometrica 81, 2033-2053.
[27] Collier, R.B., 1999. Paths Toward Democracy. The Working Class and Elites
in Western Europe and South America. Cambridge Studies in Comparative
Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
[28] Congleton, R.D., 2007. From royal to parliamentary rule without revolution:
the economics of constitutional exchange within divided governments. Euro-
pean Journal of Political Economy 23, 261-284.
[29] Congleton, R.D., 2011. Perfecting Parliament. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK.
[30] Conley, T.G., 1999. GMM estimation with cross sectional dependence. Journal
of Econometrics 92, 1-45.
[31] Conley, J.P., Temini, A., 2001. Endogenous enfranchisement when groupspref-
erences conict. Journal of Political Economy 209, 79-102.
[32] Dincecco, M., 2011. Political Transformations and Public Finances, Europe
1650-1913. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
[33] Dorsch, M.T., Maarek, P., 2014. Ine¢ cient Predation and Political Transitions,
Mimeo, Central European University Budapest.
[34] Ellis, C.J., Fender, J. 2011. Information cascades and revolutionary regime
transition. Economic Journal 121, 763792.
[35] Engerman, S.L., Sokolo¤, K.L., 2012. Economic Development in the Americas
since 1500. Endowments and Institutions. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, UK.
42
[36] Esteban, J., Mayoral, L., Ray, D., 2012. Ethnicity and conict: an empirical
investigation. American Economic Review 102, 1310-1342.
[37] Falkinger, J., 1999. Social instability and redistribution of income. European
Journal of Political Economy 15, 35-51.
[38] Fearon, J., 2003. Ethnic and cultural diversity by country. Journal of Economic
Growth 8, 1995-2222.
[39] Flora, P., with Alber, J., Eichenberg, R., Kohl, J., Kraus, F., Pfenning, W.,
Seebohm, K., 1983. State, Economy and Society 1815-1975, Vol. I. Campus
Verlag, Frankfurt, Germany.
[40] Franck, R., 2014. The political consequences of income shocks: explaining the
consolidation of democracy in France. Mimeo, Bar Ilan University.
[41] Gassebner, M., Lamla, M.J., Vreeland, J.R., 2013. Extreme bounds of democ-
racy. Journal of Conict Resolution 57, 171-197.
[42] Gleditsch, K.S., Ward, M.D., 2006. Di¤usion and the international context of
democratization. International Organization 60, 911-933.
[43] Gundlach, E., Paldam, M., 2009. A farewell to critical junctures: sorting out
long-run causality of income and democracy. European Journal of Political
Economy 25, 340-354.
[44] Hall, R.E., Jones, C.I., 1999. Why do some countries produce so much more
output per worker than others. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 83-116.
[45] Halevy, E., 1935. English public opinion and the French Revolution of the
nineteenth century. In: Coville, A., Temperley, H. (eds.), Studies in Anglo-
French History During the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
[46] Jack, W., Laguno¤, R., 2006. Dynamic enfranchisement. Journal of Public
Economics 90, 551-572
[47] Jacks, D.S., 2005. Intra- and international commodity market integration in the
Atlantic economy, 1800-1913. Explorations in Economic History 42, 381-413.
[48] Janowitz, M., 1976. Military institutions and citizenship in western societies.
Armed Forces and Society 2, 185-203.
[49] Judson, R.A., Owen, A.L., 1999. Estimating dynamic panel data models: a
practical guide for macroeconomists. Economic Letters 65, 9-15.
[50] Justman, M., Gradstein, M., 1999. The industrial revolution, political transi-
tion, and the subsequent decline in inequality in 19th-century Britain. Explo-
rations in Economic History 36, 109-127.
[51] Kim, W., 2007. Social insurance expansion and political regime dynamics in
Europe, 18801945. Social Science Quarterly 88, 494-514.
[52] King, G., Zeng, L., 2001. Logistic regression in rare events data. Political
Analysis 9, 137-163.
[53] Kuran, T., 1989. Sparks and prairie res: a theory of unanticipated political
revolution. Public Choice 61, 41-74.
[54] Lipset, S.M., 1960. Political Man: The Social Basis of Modern Politics. Dou-
bleday, New York.
43
[55] Lizzeri, A., Persico, N., 2004. Why did the elites extend the su¤rage? Democ-
racy and the scope of government, with an application to Britains Age of
Reform. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 707-765.
[56] Llavador, H., Oxoby, R.J., 2005. Partisan competition, growth, and the fran-
chise. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 1155-1192.
[57] Lopez-Cordova, J.E., Meissner, C.M., 2008. The globalization of trade and
democracy, 1870-2000. World Politics 60, 539-575.
[58] Manski, C.F., 1993. Identication of endogenous social e¤ects: the reection
problem. Review of Economic Studies 60, 531-542.
[59] Miguel, E., Satyanath, S., Sergent, E., 2004. Economic shocks and civil conict:
an instrumental variables approach. Journal of Political Economy, 112, 725-753.
[60] Papke, L.E., J.M. Wooldridge, 1996. Econometric methods for fractional re-
sponse variables with an application to 401(k) plan participation rates. Journal
of Applied Econometrics 11, 619-632.
[61] Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 2009. Democratic capital: the nexus of political and
economic change. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 1, 88-126.
[62] Potrafke, N., Vaubel, R., 2011. The interjurisdictional migration of European
authors of liberty, 1660-1961: a quantitative analysis. Mimeo, University of
Konstanz.
[63] Przeworski, A., Limongi, F., 1997. Modernization: theories and facts. World
Politics 49, 155-183.
[64] Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M.E., Cheibub, J.A., Limongi, F., 2000. Democracy
and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-
1990. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
[65] Przeworski, A., 2009. Conquered or granted? A history of su¤rage extensions.
British Journal of Political Science 39, 291-321.
[66] Sambanis, N., Hegre, H., 2006. Sensitivity analysis of empirical results on civil
war onset. Journal of Conict Resolution 50, 508-535.
[67] Seymour, C., Frary, D.P., 1918. How theWorld Votes: The Story of Democratic
Development in Elections. C. A. Nichols, Springeld, MA.
[68] Stuurman, S., 1991. 1848: Revolutionary reforms in the Netherlands. European
History Quarterly 21, 445-480.
[69] Ticchi, D., Vindigni, A., 2009. War and endogenous democracy. Mimeo, Uni-
versity of Princeton.
[70] Tilly, C., 1993. European Revolutions: 1492-1992. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford,
UK.
[71] Tilly, C., 1995. Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834. Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, MA.
[72] Tilly, C., 2004. Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650-2000. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, UK.
[73] Todd, A., 1998. Revolutions, 1789-1917. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, UK.
44
[74] Tullock, G., 1971. The paradox of revolution. Public Choice 11, 89-99.
[75] Weyland, K., 2010. The di¤usion of regime contention in European democra-
tization, 1830-1940. Comparative Political Studies 43, 1148-1176.
45
Table 1: Timing of Suffrage Reforms and Revolutionary Events in Europe, 1820-1938.  
Countrya Franchise 
extensions 
Revolutionary 
events 
Franchise 
contractions 
Panel A    
United Kingdom (1820) 1832, 1867, 1884, 
1918 
 None 
Austria (1867, 1934) 1867, 1896, 1907 1848-49 1934  
Italy (1861, 1924) 1861, 1882, 1912, 
1919 
1820, 1848-49 1924  
Norway (1820) (1814), 1884, 1897, 1919   None 
The Netherlands (1830) (1815), 1848, 1887, 1894, 
1917 
 None 
Sweden (1820) 1866, 1907, 1919   None 
France (1820) 1820, 1830, 1848, (1870) 1830, 1848,  
1870-71 
1852-1869  
Germany (1871, 1933) 1871, 1919 1848-49 1933  
Finland (1820) 1869, 1906  None 
Belgium (1830) 1831, 1848, 1893, 1919 1830-33 None 
Switzerland (1848) 1848  None 
Denmark (1820) 1849, 1915  1866  
1875-1901  
Panel B    
Luxembourg (1820) 1841, 1848, 1857, 1893, 
1902, 1919 
 1860  
Iceland (1874) 1874, 1908, 1916, 1934   None 
Spain (1820, 1936) (1812), 1820, 1834, 1837, 
1865, 1869, 1888, 1890, 
1931 
 
1820-23, 1827, 1836, 
1840, 1842, 1854-56,  
1866, 1868, 1873-74, 1890, 
1909, 1933, 1934 
1823-33, 1845  
1876, 1923  
1936, 1938  
Portugal (1820, 1926) 1822, 1838, 1852,  1878, 
1911 
1820, 1910, 1915, 1919, 
1927  
1826, 1895, 1926  
Serbia (1820) 1868, 1888, 1903, 1920 1861 1893, 1894, 1901,  
1931  
Greece (1822) 1822, 1844 1843, 1866-68, 1935,  
1938  
None 
Romania (1856, 1938) 1866, 1923  1938  
Poland (1918) 1921 1830-31, 1863-64 1926, 1935  
Hungary (1867, 1936) 1867 1848-49, 1918-19 1920, 1936  
Russia (1820, 1917) 1906 1905, 1917 1907, 1917  
Panel C    
Ireland (never)  1916  
Other part of Balkans 
(never) 
 1826, 1885, 1888, 1907  
Notes: See Data Appendix A and B for information on the coding. The franchise extensions in boldface are those which were 
followed by a franchise contraction within 10 years. The revolutionary events in boldface are those which we characterize as 
major events. a. The first year in brackets indicates the year in which the country enters our samples and the second year, if 
applicable, is the year in which the country regresses into autocracy or civil war. The 12 countries listed in panel A are included in 
the Western European Sample. The Broader European Sample includes, in addition, the 10 countries listed in panel B. The 
countries listed in panel C are not in the sample, but we make use of revolutionary events that happened in Ireland and on the 
Balkans in the construction of the measure of the threat of revolution.   
  
Table 2: Baseline Results for the Panel Model.   
Dependent variable: Suffrage. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
TRu (unweighted)  1.89***   1.86***   
 [5.88]   [5.73]   
TRg (geographical)   1.24***   1.19***  
  [6.75]   [6.44]  
TRl (linguistic)   3.13**   3.33** 
   [2.14]   [2.32] 
Suffrage lagged 0.94*** 0.94** 0.94** 0.93*** 0.93*** 0.93*** 
 [71.04] [72.76] [70.28] [69.00] [70.66] [68.25] 
Log GDP per capita     0.12 -0.22 0.34 
    [0.05] [-0.08] [0.13] 
Log population     3.92* 3.77* 3.98* 
    [1.78] [1.69] [1.84] 
Urbanization rate    0.003 0.003 0.003 
    [0.38] [0.34] [0.35] 
War    4.21*** 4.08*** 4.32*** 
    [3.97] [3.87] [4.08] 
WWI    -2.00 -1.98 -2.00 
    [-1.05] [-1.07] [-1.08] 
Educational attainment    -0.81 -0.8 -0.84 
    [-0.93] [-0.93] [-0.97] 
Gold standard    0.24 0.2 0.26 
    [0.31] [0.26] [0.34] 
Observations 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 
Number of countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Estimation technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Selection-ratio    3.7 5.9 2.5 
Notes: z statistics in square brackets are based on PCSE standard errors allowing for panel heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneously correlated across panel units, and for a country specific AR(1) process over time (clustering by country); * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimations include country and two-year time fixed effects. 
We estimate with the xtpcse command in STATA 13 (Beck and Katz, 1995). It estimates the parameters by OLS and calculates 
PCSE corrected standard errors. The selection-ratio (Altonji et al., 2005) indicates how many times stronger selection on 
unobserved factors needs to be relative to selection on the observable factors included in the three specifications for the point 
estimate on the threat of revolution variables to be attributable entirely to omitted variables bias. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3: Results for the Panel Model: Conley spatial dependence, the reflection problem, reverse 
causality and own revolutions. 
Dependent variable: Suffrage  ∆Suffrage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
         
TRg  1.19** 1.19** 1.19*** 1.21***  1.18***   
 (2.09) (2.54) (3.48) [6.19]  [6.37]   
TRg (lagged)     1.02**   1.26*** 
     [2.55]   [3.04] 
Suffrage reforms abroad    -1.01     
    [-0.35]     
Own revolution      9.12***   
      [4.00]   
Observations 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069  1069 
Number of countries 12 12 12 12 12 12  12 
Estimation technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS  OLS 
Spatial correction 500km 800km 1400km PCSE  PCSE PCSE  PCSE 
Notes: z statistics in brackets are based on spatial (Conley, 1999) standard errors for three different radiuses; z statistics in square 
brackets are based on PCSE standard errors allowing for panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneously correlated across panel 
units, and for a panel specific AR(1) process over time (clustering by country); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. All estimations include country and two-year time fixed effects and the same set of control variables as in Table 
2, column five. The results in columns one to three are obtained with the OLS estimator and the standard errors proposed by 
Conley (1999) which allow for contemporaneous spatial dependence amongst the disturbances. The metric used to measure 
distance between panel units is distance in kilometres between pairs of capital cities. The three specifications differ in the assumed 
cut-off after which the spatial dependence is zero. The results in columns four and five are obtained with the same estimation 
technique as in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 4: Within year Timing of Revolutionary Events and Suffrage Reforms 
Year Onset of revolutionary event Announcement of concession 
1820 Spain: January 
Portugal: January 
Italy: July 
France: November 
 
1830 France: July. 
Belgium: August 25 
France: July 
United Kingdom: November 
Belgium: December 20 
1848 Southern Italy: January 
France: February 22 
Germany: March 3 
Austria: March 12 
Northern Italy: March 22 
Hungary: May 
Switzerland: January 27 
France: February 24 
Luxemburg: March 20 
Denmark (1849): March 18 
Netherlands: March 27 
Belgium: March 29 
1871 France: May Germany (1871): 1867 
1905 Russia: January 9 Finland (1906): November 12 
Russia: February 18 
1915 Portugal: May 10 Denmark: May 7 
1916 Ireland: Easter  
1917 Russia: February  
 
United Kingdom (1918): 1912 
The Netherlands: Summer. 
1918 Hungary: November  Germany (1919): November. 
Sweden (1919): December 
1919  Italy: 1919.  
Norway:  June. 
Belgium: 1919. 
Notes: For each of the major revolutionary events, and for each suffrage reform that happened in the same calendar 
year, we have recorded the date of the onset of the revolutionary event and the date of the announcement of the reform or the 
date at which the process that led to the suffrage reform started. In column three, we record in bracket the year in which the reform 
was finally adopted, if this is different from the year in which the reform was announced. 
Source: The information used to record these dates is given in the Data Appendix. 
 
Table 5: Results for the Panel Model: One-year time fixed effects.  
Dependent variable: Suffrage ∆Suffrage Suffrage ∆Suffrage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
TRg  1.18***   1.03*   
 [6.35]   {1.85}   
    (1.81)   
TRg (lagged)  1.15*** 1.41***  1.10** 1.37*** 
  [2.88] [3.42]  {2.14} {2.67} 
     (2.46) (2.62) 
       
Observations 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 
Number of countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 
One-year fixed effects NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Two-year fixed effects YES YES YES NO NO NO 
Estimation technique OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Spatial correlation PCSE 
 
PCSE 
 
PCSE 
 
Conley Conley Conley 
Notes: z statistics in square brackets are based on PCSE standard errors allowing for panel heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneously correlated across panel units, and for a panel specific AR(1) process over time (clustering by country); z 
statistics in curly brackets are PCSE standard errors without spatial correlation, but with panel heteroskedasticity adjustment and 
clustering by country; z statistics in brackets are based on spatial (Conley, 1999) standard errors (1400km); * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimations in columns one to three include country and two-year time fixed 
effects and the same set of control variables as in Table 3, column six, except that we exclude the dummy for WWI to make these 
estimations comparable to those reported in columns four to six. The estimations in four to six include country and one-year time 
fixed effects and the same set of control variables as in Table 3, column six, except that the dummy for WWI drops out because it 
is perfectly collinear with the one-year time fixed effects.  
  
 Table 6: Results for the Panel Model: Repression, Transfers, Economics Shocks and Other 
Robustness Checks.  
Dependent variable: Suffrage. 
 (1) (2) (3)b (4)b,c (5)b,c (6)  (7)c (8)d 
         
TRg  1.91*** 1.37*** 1.21*** 1.18*** 1.17***  1.19*** 1.18*** 
 [4.49] [6.76] [6.53] [6.00] [5.87]  [6.01] [5.55] 
TRg (all)      0.84***   
      [4.89]   
Repression  -0.02       
  [-0.45]       
Fiscal transfers -0.05        
 [-1.22]        
Trend   0.29      
   [0.10]      
Cycle   3.48      
   [0.54]      
Log Rainfall    2.70     
    [1.17]     
Log Rainfall, lag    0.52     
    [2.22]     
Rainfall growth     1.65    
     [0.92]    
Rainfall growth, lag     1.01    
     [0.59]    
Observations 618 875 1045 809 809 1069 809 1089 
No. of countries 9 a 9 a 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Robustness check Repres-
sion 
Fiscal 
transfers 
Cycle 
GDP 
Cycle 
Rain 
shocks 
Cycle 
Rain 
shocks 
All  
events 
Till 
1913 
only 
Demo-
cratic 
reversals  
 
Notes: z statistics in square brackets are based on PCSE standard errors allowing for panel heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneously correlated across panel units, and for a panel specific AR(1) process over time (clustering by country); * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimations use the same estimation technique and include 
country and two-year time fixed effects and the same set of control variables as in Table 2, column five. a. Data from Austria, 
Germany and Switzerland are missing. b. Log GDP per capita is replaced by cycle and trend or by the rainfall variables as 
appropriate. c. Till 1913. d. Reversals are included.  
  
Table 7: Results for the Panel Model: Alternative Estimation Methods.  
Dependent variable: Suffrage. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
TRg  1.19*** 1.19*** 1.19*** 1.20*** 1.32*** 1.38*** 0.11** 
 [4.91] [6.38] [5.04] [4.01] [4.70] [4.59] [2.05] 
Observations 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 1069 1061 
Number of countries 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Estimation technique OLS OLS OLS Bruno GMM Tobit Fractional 
Spatial correlation No Unrestricted No No No No No 
Clustering No No Country No No No Yes 
Notes: z statistics in square brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimations include 
country and two-year time fixed effects and the same set of control variables as in Table 2, column five. The standard errors in 
columns one to three are adjusted for panel heteroskedasticity. The estimator used in column four is the bias-corrected least 
squares estimator proposed by Bruno (2005). The results in column five are obtained with the system-GMM estimator proposed 
by Blundell and Bond (1998). The marginal effect conditional on suffrage being strictly between 0 and 100 is the same as the 
coefficient estimate reported in column six. The fractional estimator used in column seven is due to Papke and Wooldridge (1996) 
and it transforms suffrage with a logit link. The coefficient is not comparable to the others, but exp(0.11) can be interpreted as an 
odds ratio. 
  
Table 8: Results from the Event History Study, Western European Sample. 
Dependent variable: reform.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)a (8) 
TRu (unweighted) 0.75***        
 [5.25]        
TRg (geographical)  0.50***   0.40*** 0.48*** 0.39*** 0.73*** 
  [7.57]   [4.84] [7.34] [9.75] [4.30] 
TRl (linguistic)   3.93***      
   [5.38]      
TRg (lagged)    0.40***     
    [4.61]     
Suffrage reforms abroad     5.44***    
     [3.09]    
Log GDP per capita 2.45** 2.29** 1.66*** 2.13** 2.06** 2.11** 1.36 2.37 
 [2.44] [2.23] [2.59] [2.18] [2.17] [2.09] [1.44] [0.82] 
Log population  0.47* 0.49* 0.32 0.47* 0.43* 0.45* 0.20 5.47 
 [1.75] [1.80] [1.03] [1.72] [1.69] [1.68] [1.05] [1.26] 
Urbanization rate  -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.0009 -0.003 
 [-1.53] [-1.55] [-0.85] [-1.29] [-1.34] [-1.37] [-0.39] [-0.32] 
War -0.15 -0.29 0.18 0.101 -0.10 -0.21 -0.04 -0.88 
 [-0.20] [-0.47] [0.12] [0.10] [-0.16] [-0.35] [-0.06] [-0.15] 
WWI -1.52 -1.17 -2.14 -1.36 -0.92 -0.96 -0.89 -2.40** 
 [-1.15] [-0.93] [-1.24] [-0.95] [-0.74] [-0.78] [-0.71] [-1.96] 
Educational attainment  -0.06 0.005 -0.24 -0.03 0.06 0.01 0.42 0.042 
 [-0.09] [0.007] [-0.40] [-0.05] [0.08] [0.02] [0.68] [0.05] 
Gold standard -1.12* -0.95* -0.70 -1.15** -0.83 -0.87 -0.72 -1.21** 
 [-1.93] [-1.68] [-1.47] [2.16] [-1.51] [-1.56] [-1.22] [-2.05] 
Observations 713 713 713 713 713 713 739b 713 
Number of countries 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 
Estimation technique Logit 
clustered 
by 
country 
Logit 
clustered 
by 
country 
Logit 
clustered 
by 
country 
Logit 
clustered 
by 
country 
Logit 
clustered 
by 
country 
Rare 
events 
logit 
Logit 
clustered 
by 
country 
Cond. 
fixed 
effects 
logit 
Notes:  z statistics based on clustered (by country) standard errors in square brackets, except in column five; * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant term not reported. Only 11 countries are included in the event history study, as Switzerland had full male 
suffrage from the time it became unified. The dependent variable reform is coded as 1 if country i introduced a franchise extension in year t and 
as 0 in the years before and after that. A country drops out of the sample in the year after universal male suffrage was reached or if it, before that 
happened, regressed into dictatorship. A country enters the “risk set” either in 1820 or at the time of independence (as recorded in column one of 
Table 1). We follow Beck et al. (1998) and use a discrete logistic specification (logit) to estimate the conditional probability of a reform in a 
given year. In column five, we adopt the rare events logit estimator by King and Zeng (2001) and in column seven we include fixed effects 
directly in the logic model. All estimations allow for duration dependence of the hazard rate. A likelihood ratio test indicates strong duration 
dependence in the baseline hazard rate. a. Reform is coded to exclude franchise extensions that were followed by a franchise contraction within a 
10 years window. b. The extra observations are due to the fact that France stays in the sample till 1870 and Italy stays till 1924. 
  
 
Table 9: Results from the Event History Study, Broader European Sample. 
Dependent variable: reform.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4)e (5) (6) (7) (8)e 
TRg  0.31*** 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.40*** 0.28*** 
 [4.78] [4.79] [5.11] [4.40] [4.15] [4.17] [3.97] [3.69] 
Log GDP per capita     0.14 0.16 0.707 0.60 
      [0.29] [0.33] [0.38] [0.87] 
Log population      0.31** 0.30** 2.03 -0.46 
     [2.47] [2.45] [0.81] [1.37] 
War 0.15 0.23 0.29 0.25 0.48 0.53 0.579 0.34 
  [0.28] [0.43] [0.494] [0.44] [0.69] [0.77] [0.84] [0.67] 
WWI 0.04 0.14 -0.201 0.20 -0.58 -0.45 -1.15 0.15 
 [0.06] [0.21] [-0.332] [0.28] [-0.66] [-0.52] [-1.45] [1.37] 
Observations 1700 1700 1700 1726 d 1132 1132 1063 1158d 
Number of countries 21a 21a 21a 21a 17b 17b 15c 17b 
Estimation technique Logit 
clustered 
by 
country 
Rare 
Events 
logit 
Condi-
tional 
fixed 
effects  
Logit 
 
Logit 
clustered 
by 
country 
Logit 
clustered 
by 
country 
Rare 
Events 
logit 
Condi-
tional 
fixed 
effects  
Logit 
 
Logit 
clustered 
by 
country 
Notes: z statistics based on clustered (by country) standard errors in square brackets, except in columns two and six; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The definition of reform and the details of estimation techniques are in notes to Table 7. All estimations 
allow for duration dependence of the hazard rate. A likelihood ratio test indicates strong duration dependence in the baseline hazard rate. a. The 
sample includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Hungary, Portugal, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Serbia, Poland, Russia and Rumania. b. These specifications exclude Russia, Serbia, Iceland, 
and Luxembourg. c. This specification excludes Hungary and Poland as well as the countries listed under b. d. The extra observations are due to 
the fact that France stays in the sample till 1870 and Italy stays till 1924.  e. The specification excludes franchise extensions that were reversed 
within ten years.   
  
 Table 10: Additional Results for the Panel and Event History Models, Western European Sample 
 (1)b (2)b (3) (4) (5)b (6)b (7) (8) 
Robustness check Add 
trade 
volumes 
Add 
wheat 
price 
spread 
Add 
agricultural 
share 
Add war- 
intensity  
Add 
trade 
volumes 
Add 
wheat 
price 
spread 
Add 
agricultural 
share 
Add war- 
intensity  
 
         
Dependent variable Suffrage Reform 
   
TRg  1.49*** 1.51*** 0.89*** 1.19*** 0.52*** 0.51** 0.41*** 0.49*** 
  [7.19] [3.97] [3.74] [6.47] [6.44] [2.28] [4.31] [6.58] 
Trade volume  0.02    0.01    
  [1.44]    [1.63]    
Wheat price spread  4.91    13.55**   
   [1.44]    [2.42]   
Agricultural share    -0.01    0.001  
    [-1.41]    [0.20]  
War intensity     5.59**    -0.21 
     [2.26]    [-0.16] 
Observations 858 436 876 1069 585 355 533 713 
Number of countries 12 7 a 12 12 11a 7 b 11 11 
Estimation technique OLS 
with 
PCSE 
clustered 
by 
country 
OLS 
with 
PCSE 
clustered 
by 
country 
OLS 
 with 
PCSE 
clustered 
by  
country 
OLS 
with 
PCSE 
clustered 
by 
country 
Logit 
clustered 
by 
country 
Logit 
clustered 
by 
country 
 
Logit 
clustered 
by 
country 
Logit 
clustered 
by 
country 
Notes: See notes to Table 2 and Table 7. The independent variable in the estimations in columns one to four is suffrage. These estimations 
include country and two-year time fixed effects and the same set of control variables as in Table 2. We only report the coefficients on the new 
variables which are added to each specification. The models in columns five to eight are all logit models for the probability of a suffrage reform. 
These estimations include the same control variables as in Table 7 and allow for duration dependence.  a. Data from Denmark, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland are missing; b. Gold standard is replaced by the alternative measure(s) of trade integration. 
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1 Theory Appendix: Proofs
Deriving bqREV OLT . At stage 3, which is reached only if the insiders neither ex-
tended the franchise nor invested in repression in stage 2, the outsiders do not know
the social state. Suppose they observe an uninformative report. In this case, q1t = q
(and is expected to be at this level in all future periods). If the outsiders do not
revolt, then they get yO(A) + VO(A); where VO(A) is the outsidersexpected dis-
counted utility when the political state is autocracy. If they decide to revolt, they
face a lottery and their expected discounted utility is
(1  qp) (yO(A)  + VO(A)) + qp(yO(S)
1     ): (1)
Suppose that q is such that the outsiders never start a revolution. Then VO(A) =
yO(A)
1  ; and we can nd the critical value of q at which they are indi¤erent between
revolting and not revolting after receiving L1t = 1 as bqREV OLT dened in equation
(1).
Deriving condition [D], bqDEMOCRACY and bqREPRESSION . Democratization
yields yI(D)
1  ; while repression yields yI(A)    +  yI(A)1  because the revolution is
avoided for sure in this period and there is no expectation of a revolution in the
future given Assumption 1. A simple comparison shows that franchise extension is
better than repression if condition [D] holds. The expected payo¤ of doing nothing
after receiving the report L1t = l is the lottery
pq
l
0 +

1  pq
l

yI(A) + yI(A)
1  

: (2)
Accordingly, if condition [D] holds (fails), we know that democratization (repres-
sion) is better than repression (democratization) and we can compare this expected
payo¤ to yI(D)
1  (yI(A)   +  yI(A)1  ). This yields conditions (3) and (4) in the text,
respectively.
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2 Data Appendix A
This appendix details the coding of su¤rage reforms in Europe 1820-1938 and other
aspects of the samples used in the study. The Western European sample in-
cludes Austria, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Germany, the United Kingdom (excluding Ireland), France, Italy, and Switzerland.
The broader European sampleincludes Spain, Portugal, Greece, Iceland, Luxem-
bourg, Serbia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Romania in addition to those included
in the Western European sample.
A country enters the sample in 1820 or when it becomes an independent state.
The entry year is recorded in the country tables (A1 to A22) below and in Table
1 in the text. In the cases, where it is not straightforward to determine the entry
year, a justication for the choice is given. In the main specications, a coun-
try drops out if it regresses into some form of autocracy or into civil war (e.g.,
Germany (1933), Austria (1934), Italy (1924), Spain (1936), Russia (1917)) before
1938. In some specications, we keep countries in the sample after they regress to
autocracy/dictatorship.
Tables A1 to A22 detail how we coded the years of franchise extensionsand
franchise contractions. We have also, in some cases, recorded additional informa-
tion about the evolution of democratic institutions in the sample and other relevant
historical facts. This includes the year of womens su¤rage, the introduction of the
secret ballot or changes in the election rule, etc.
We use the following denitions to code the years of franchise extensionsand
franchise contractionsas recorded in Table 1 in the main text and detailed below:
1) A franchise extensionis a reform that relaxes socio-economic qualica-
tions on the right to vote in elections to the lower chamber of parliament for men.
This includes lowering of income, tax payment, and wealth qualications; abolish-
ment of education qualications; enfranchisement of recipients of public support;
and other such socio-economic qualications, as well as the introduction of (quali-
ed) voting rights in the rst place.
Comment: We do not include womens su¤rage or reforms that lowered the
voting age, except if these happen in conjunction with changes in socio-economic
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qualications, in the denition of a franchise extension. All the reforms recorded are
de jure and varied in the de facto power they conferred on the newly enfranchised
voters.
2) A franchise contraction is a) a reform that increases one or more of
the socio-economic qualications listed above and thus de jure (and de facto) dis-
enfranchises voters who have previously enjoyed the right to vote or b) a discrete
change in the rules that de facto restricts the right to vote which happens subse-
quent to a franchise extensionas dened above and which do not coincide with
that extension.
Comment: We want to record instances where voting rights which have been
granted previously are subsequently taken back, either de jure or de facto. De facto
franchise contractions require a discrete change and must happen subsequent to a
franchise extension. Thus, this implies that we do not count the fact that the broad
franchise in Imperial Germany introduced in 1871 was de facto restricted by the
fact that electoral corruption was widespread, but we do count the de facto overturn
of the Weimar Constitution by the Nazi regime in 1933. Likewise, we count the
Second Empire from 1852 to 1869 in France, where elections were systematically
manipulated, and the constitutional amendment in Denmark in 1866 as instances
of franchise contraction.
In the tables below, we indicate in boldface the years that we count as years
of franchise extension and indicate in italics the years that we count as years of
franchise contraction.
The sources used to construct these data are: Flora et al. (1983),1 Carstairs
(1980), Seymour and Frary (1918), Campbell (1958), Cook and Paxton (1998) and
Caramani (2000). We have, in addition, made extensive use of Encyclopaedia Bri-
tannica (1911, 2009), Ortega and Blanco (1990), and Batakovi´c (2007).
[Appendix Table A1 to A22]
1Notice that the dates given in chapter 3 of Flora et al. (1983) are the years of the rst and
last election under a given set of franchise rules, not the year in which the legislation was adopted.
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3 Data Appendix B
This appendix details the coding of revolutionary events in Europe 1820-1938. The
coding is based on Tilly (1993, 2004) and is crosschecked with Todd (1998) and
Hobsbawm (1962) and supplemented with information from Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica (1911, 2009). Besides revolutionary events that took place in the countries
included in the broader European sample, we also include events that took place
in other countries in the Balkans and in Ireland.
Tilly denes revolutionary events as those instances when for a month or more
at least two blocks of people backed by armed forces and receiving support from
a substantial part of the general population exercised control over important seg-
ments of state organization (Tilly, 2004, p. 73). This denition is intended to
capture major instances of regime contention and includes examples of an array of
popular rebellions, civil wars, and military and other types of coups détat. Other
events, such as the riots that took place at the time when the British Parliament
deliberated the Great Reform Act in 1831, are too insignicant to be counted as a
revolutionary eventaccording to Tillys denition. This does not mean that they
were not important locally, but it does mean that we assume that they were unlikely
to have made much of an impression abroad. Conceptually, we want to focus on
(revolutionary) events that are concentrated over a short window of time, where
the aim is fundamental social and political change, and where the revolt has some
measure of popular support. For this reason, we have divided Tillys catalogue of
revolutionary events into two broad groups.
The rst group is the revolutionary events upon which our measures of the threat
of revolution are based. This includes events characterized as revolutions, revolts,
insurrections and rebellions, and risings. We further divide these events into major
and minor events. The minor events are those which we, based on the discussion
in Tilly (1993, 2004), and the coverage given to them in Encyclopaedia Britannica
(1911, 2009) and by Hobsbawm (1962), judge to be less likely to have made an
impact abroad while the major ones clearly did. We list these events in Tables B1
(major) and B2 (minor). In the estimations, we make use of both lists.
The second group includes events which we exclude from our analysis because
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we judge them to be too far away from the theoretical concept of revolution. This
includes events which are characterized as independence wars, military coups or
coups détat, mutiny, civil war, foreign invasion, general strikes, and prolonged
periods of (low-level) insurrections. These events are, for completeness, listed in
Table B3.
[Appendix Tables B1 to B3]
4 Data Appendix C
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the estimations are reported in Table
C1, and their precise denition and sources are as follows:2
1. Su¤rage is the electorate in percentage of the enfranchised age and sex group;
before the womens su¤rage, male population only (parliamentary elections).
We assign the value of zero to su¤rage for the years before the rst franchise
reform allowed national elections to the main legislative body based on a well-
dened set of su¤rage rules. In some countries these reforms were pre-dated
by various elected or appointed advisory bodies. Examples of this include
elections for a farmers chamber in Sweden in the 1820s and in Denmark
before the constitution of 1849. In the Netherlands, the su¤rage was quite
broad for a while, but was curtailed by the French and reduced under its
new royal constitution after the Vienna Congress (see Congleton, 2011). No
quantitative information exists for how broad these su¤rages were, but the
historical narrative clearly indicates that they were very narrow and often did
not lead to any real inuence on public policy. Sources: Flora et al. (1983),
Caramani (2000), Cook and Paxton (1998), and Aidt and Jensen (2009).
2. TRkit is the measure of the threat of revolution. For k = u it is a simple count
of the revolutionary events in a given year; for k = g, the events are weighted
by the (inverse) geographic distance; for k = l, the events are weighted by
2For further notes on the construction of many of the control variables, see Aidt and Jensen
(2009).
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linguistic distance,3 in all cases excluding events in each country itself. The
main specication includes major events (listed in Table B1) only. For ro-
bustness, we also calculate the measures using all events including those minor
ones listed in Table B2. Sources: Tilly (1993, 2004), Todd (1998), and En-
cyclopaedia Britannica (1911, 2009). The source used to construct linguistic
distance is Fearon (2003).
3. Own revolution is a dummy variable equal to one in country i in year t if that
country experienced a major revolutionary event in that year.
4. GDP per capita is real GDP at international 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars, ad-
justed to exclude the impact of border changes, per capita. Source: Maddison
(2003).
5. Population is the size of the total population in 1000s. Source: Maddison
(2003).
6. Agricultural share is the number of individuals employed in agriculture, min-
ing, and shing per 1000 employees. Source: Mitchell (2007).
7. Urbanization rate is the proportion of the population who lives in towns with
more than 20,000 inhabitants. Source: Banks (2003).
8. Education attainment is a dummy coded 1 for the years after which enrollment
in primary education as a percentage of all 5-14-year-olds reached 60% and 0
otherwise. Sources: Flora (1983) and Mitchell (2007).
9. Gold standard is a dummy equal to 1 if a country is on the gold standard in
a given year and 0 otherwise. Sources: Meissner (2004) and EH.net encyclo-
pedia (eh.net/encyclopedia).
10. Trade volume is exports plus imports relative to GDP. Sources: Mitchell
(2007), Statistics Netherlands (1999), Buyst (1997), Krantz and Schön (2007),
3We use the dominant language group, except for Switzerland and Belgium where we base
the calculation on a population weighted average. The linguistic tree contains up to 15 nested
categories. We are missing information on some of the countries in the broader European sample
and so we cannot construct the linguistic distance weights for that sample.
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Grytten (2004), Flandreau and Zumer (2004), and the Swiss Economic and
Social History online database (www.fsw.uzh.ch/histstat).
11. Wheat price spread is an estimate of the trade cost between two locations in a
given period based on di¤erences in wheat prices at the two locations. Source:
Jacks (2005).
12. SRN it is dened as a linguistic distance weighted average of franchise reforms
in other countries than country i in year t. Sources: Fearon (2003) and the
sources used to dene years of franchise reform recorded in Table 1.
13. War is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is at war and 0 otherwise.
We do not include colonial wars. The available data on the size of armies have
insu¢ cient time and country coverage to be of use in our setting. Sources:
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911, 2009) and Singer and Small (1994).
14. WWI is a dummy equal to 1 during World War I (1914-18) for all countries
and 0 otherwise.
15. War intensity is the number of deaths on the battle eld per capita. Source:
Singer and Small (1994) or http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.
16. Repression is the share of total central government spending on police, de-
fence, general administration, and the judiciary. Source: Flora et al. (1983)
and Fearon (2003).
17. Fiscal transfers is the share of total central government spending on health,
education, housing, and various government-sponsored insurance and welfare
programs. Source: Flora et al. (1983) and Fearon (2003).
18. Gini is the Gini coe¢ cient for income inequality. A value of zero expresses
total equality and a value of one maximal inequality. Data are available only
with 20-year intervals. We have interpolated the missing observations linearly.
Source: Bourguignon and Morrisson (2001, 2002).
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19. ALHomeit is the number of authors of libertyaged 20 and above who are born
and living in country i in year t per 1000 inhabitants. Source: Potrafke and
Vaubel (2011).
20. ALAbroadit is the number of authors of libertyaged 20 and above who were
born and grew up in country i; but at some time in adulthood emigrated
to another country and in year t lived outside their home country per 1000
inhabitants. Source: Potrafke and Vaubel (2011).
21. Rainfall is yearly rainfall in millimeters. The rain data is constructed for a
grit by Casty et al. (2007). We have constructed the country-year data by cal-
culating the average of rainfall in the grit cells that falls inside a country, with
appropriate weighting if there is only partial overlap. The data can be down-
loaded from http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/pubs/casty2007/casty2007.html
22. Rainfall, growth is the change in the logarithm of rainfall.
[Table C1]
5 Appendix D: Robustness Checks
1. Table D1 reports on the results of some robustness checks for the event history
study where we have added additional variables.
<Table D1 to appear here>
2. As an alternative check on the importance of enlightment shocks, we can
investigate the possibility that the enlightenment shocks left in the residuals
are correlated across time. To this end, we cluster the standard error by year.
The result is:4
su¤rageit = 0:94
(0:013)
su¤rageit 1 + ::::+ 1:19
(0:41)
TRgit + :: (3)
4The control variables are the same as in Table 2 column ve of the main text. The standard
errors are shown in brackets under the coe¢ cient estimates and are clustered by year. Similar
results are obtained with the other two proxies for the threat of revolution [not reported].
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We observe this has little impact on the signicance of the e¤ect. If we cluster
at the two-years frequency, the point estimate is una¤ected (1.19) with a
standard error of 0.54.
3. Su¤rage as well as several of the control variables are trending up and may be
or behave as if they were non-stationary.5 To confront this issue, we estimate
an Error Correction Model
su¤rageit = 1TR
g
it + Xit (4)
+
 
su¤rageit 1   1TRgit 1  Xit 1!

+ "it:
The term in parentheses is the long-run relation appropriately adjusted to
match our other estimations, and the parameter  captures the adjustment
to the long-run equilibrium. The estimated equation is6
su¤rageit = 1:12
(0:19)
TRgit+:::  0:039
(0:0096)

su¤rageit 1   44:9
(10:81)
TRgit 1   ::

: (5)
The estimates imply a signicant positive short-run e¤ect of changes in the
threat of revolution on changes in su¤rage and a substantial long-run e¤ect.
The negative estimate of  implies adjustment to long-run equilibrium. All in
all, our results are not an artifact of non-stationary data.
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The Western European sample 
 
Table A1. The United Kingdom (in sample from 1820) 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
Pre-
1832 
Restricted and unequal manhood suffrage with 
relatively high, but locally different, economic 
requirement. 
 
Electoral corruption 
widespread. 
1832 The Great Reform Act. Reduction and standardization 
of income and property qualifications. The process 
started with Lord Grey’s government formed in 
November 1830. 
Redistribution of seats. 
1867 The Second Reform Act. Reduction of income and 
property requirements. 
Redistribution of seats. 
1872  The Secret Ballot. 
1884 The Third Reform Act. Reduction and standardization 
of economic qualifications for the county and borough 
constituencies. 
Redistribution of seats and 
single member districts as a 
rule. 
1918 The Fourth Reform Act. Universal and almost equal 
suffrage for male citizens over 21. The process had 
started in 1912 with Asquith’s Liberal government 
introducing the Franchise and Distribution Act. This 
proposed to increase the number of male voters, but did 
not include rights for women. The Speaker’s 
Conference of 1916 recommended universal male 
suffrage, votes for women and some proportional 
representation. 
This includes the right to 
vote for married women 
above 30 years and over 
who are householders or 
wives of householders. 
Redistribution of seats. 
1928  Women’s suffrage. 
 
  
Table A2: Austria (in sample from 1867; regress to autocracy in 1934) 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
1815-
1866 
 Member of the German Confederation (which 
the Austrian Empire established after the 
defeat of Napoleon).  
1866  War with Prussia in 1866 dissolves the 
Confederation and Austria remains outside 
the German Empire established amongst the 
other German states in 1871 under the 
leadership of Prussia. 
1867  The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, 
under which the House of Habsburg agreed to 
share power with a separate Hungarian 
government, dividing the territory of the 
former Austrian Empire between them. The 
Austrian and the Hungarian lands became 
independent entities enjoying equal status and 
we treat the two as independent units in the 
extended sample from 1867. 
1867 The Constitution of 1867 introduced 
restricted and unequal manhood 
suffrage in four electoral classes 
(curia): 
a) Great landowners who paid 
a minimum on estates. 
b) Members of chambers of 
commerce and trade. 
c) 24 year old male inhabitants 
of towns and cities who paid 
minimum direct taxes. 
d) 24 year old male inhabitants 
of rural communes who paid 
minimum direct taxes. 
Bicameral imperial parliament with an upper 
house and a house of representatives, the 
latter elected indirectly by the Landtags, but 
with the provision that a direct election could 
be held if a Landtag (provincial assembly) did 
not send representatives. 
1873 Unchanged All elections for the lower chamber were 
direct. 
1896 Additional fifth curia introduced in 
which there was universal and equal 
suffrage for male citizens over 24; 
electors of the first four curia gained 
a second vote. 
 
1907 Universal and equal suffrage for 
male citizens over 24. The curial 
system abolished. 
Street demonstrations. Direct elections. Secret 
ballot, compulsory voting in four provinces. 
Majority representation, single-member 
constituencies. 
1918  Declaration of German Austria as a 
democratic republic. 
1919 Universal and equal suffrage for 
men and women over the age of 20. 
Proportional representation. Women’s 
suffrage. Secret ballot. Compulsory voting in 
two provinces. 
1920 Unchanged Federal structure, with Nationalrat (lower 
house) which was directly elected by 
universal suffrage and an upper house 
(Bundesrat) which represented the Lander 
(states). 
1929 Unchanged Direct election of the president by the 
enfranchised population instead of by 
parliament, but no presidential election held 
till 1951. 
1934  Nazi party takes over. 
 
Table A3: Italy (in the sample from 1861, regress to autocracy in 19241). 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
1820-
1860 
The individual Italian states had their own 
constitutions.  
 
By 1860, there were four Italian 
states (the Austrians in Venetia, the 
Papal States, the Kingdom of 
Piedmont-Sardinia, and the Kingdom 
of the Two Sicilies). On March 17, 
1861, the Parliament proclaimed 
Victor Emmanuel II King of Italy 
and the Kingdom of Italy was 
established. Venetia and the Papal 
States (Rome) were not integrated till 
1866 and 1870, respectively. 
1861 Equal but restricted manhood suffrage; 
limited to citizens of 25 years and over who 
paid minimum direct taxes and who could 
read and write. 
Direct elections with secret ballot, 
Majority representation in single 
member districts. 
1882 Equal but restricted manhood suffrage; 
limited to citizens of 21 years and over; 
same restrictions as in 1861 except that tax 
minima and equivalent wealth requirement 
were reduced and suffrage granted to higher 
officials and other citizens with certain 
educational qualifications without further 
census restrictions. 
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Majority rule. Majority 
representation in multi member 
districts. 
1894  Revision of electoral registers 
resulted in a considerable reduction 
in the size of the electorate. 
1912 Almost universal and equal suffrage for 
male citizens of 30 years and over and in 
addition for male citizens of 21 years and 
over, who had completed their military 
service, or had finished primary school, paid 
minimum tax, and exercised official 
functions. 
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Majority rule. Majority 
representation in multi member 
districts. 
1919 Universal and equal manhood suffrage for 
citizens of 21 years and over, in addition 
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Proportional representation. 
                                                 
1 We let Italy exit in 1924. In 1923, the Acerbo law had been passed, which effectively allowed Mussolini to be 
a sure winner of the 1924 election, and thus after 1923, Italy was effectively non-democratic. 
suffrage for all men who participated in the 
war without age restrictions. 
1924  Mussolini.  
(1946) Universal and equal suffrage for all citizens 
of 21 years and over. 
Women’s suffrage. 
 
 
Table A4: Norway (in the sample from 1820). 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
(1814) Equal but restricted manhood suffrage 
with relatively high occupational and 
property requirements. 
Norway did not gain full independence 
until 1905. However, during the Union 
with Sweden, it kept its liberal constitution 
and independent institutions, except for the 
foreign service, and could control its 
franchise rules. Indirect elections with open 
voting; majority representation. 
1884 Extension of the franchise to citizens 
paying taxes on income above given 
minima. 
Secret ballot. 
1897 Almost universal and equal suffrage 
for male citizens of 25 years and 
overs. Suffrage suspended in cases of 
bankruptcy and for paupers receiving 
public assistance. 
Indirect, secret ballot. Majority 
representation. 
1905  Union with Sweden dissolved. 
1905  Direct elections. 
1907 Extension of suffrage to women if 
own or husband’s income exceeded 
minima. 
(This has caused an artificial drop in 
suffrage as recorded by Flora et al. (1983) 
which we have corrected.) 
1913 Almost universal and equal suffrage 
for men and women of 25 years and 
over. Suspended only for paupers. 
Women’s suffrage. 
1919 Lowering of the voting age from 25 to 
23. Paupers allowed to vote. 
Proportional representation. 
 
  
Table A5: The Netherlands (in the sample from 1830). 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
(1815) The members of the lower chamber were 
elected by the 18 provincial councils 
which consisted of different Estates. 
The union with Belgium established in 
1814 was codified in the constitution 
adopted in 1815. This constitution 
established a two-chamber system. The 
upper chamber was nominated by the 
Crown. The lower chamber was 
indirectly elected and initially intended to 
have equal representation from the 
Netherlands and from Belgium. 
1830 Unchanged The Belgian Revolution; the union with 
Belgium dissolved. 
1840 Unchanged After the independence of Belgium in 
1830, a revision of the constitution was 
adopted in 1840, but both the 1815 and 
1840 constitutions were based on the 
same franchise rules and indirect 
elections. As a consequence, the 
constitution of 1840 does not represent a 
franchise extension, just an adjustment of 
the existing rules to accommodate the 
fact that Belgium no longer was part of 
the Union. 
1848 Equal but restricted manhood suffrage 
for citizens of 23 years and over. Vote 
contingent on surpassing relatively high 
direct tax minima. 
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Majority representation. 
1848-68: the powers of the elected 
parliament were de facto in question till 
1868.  
1887 The right to vote was made dependent 
on education and property. The franchise 
was expanded, to about 29% of adult 
men. The direct tax minima and 
equivalent requirement of renting or 
owing a house a above a certain rental 
value reduced.  
 
1894 Equal but restricted suffrage for male 
citizens of 25 years and over, with 
relatively low qualifications. 
 
1917 Universal male suffrage with voting age 
of 25. Pacification Act of 1917. Autumn. 
Direct elections. Proportional 
representation. Compulsory voting. In 
1917, like in 1848 influenced by the 
tense international situation, manhood 
suffrage was introduced combined with a 
system of proportional representation to 
elect the House of Representatives, the 
States-Provincial and the municipality 
councils. By the revision of 1922 
universal suffrage was explicitly adopted 
in the constitution, after it had already 
been introduced by law in 1919 
1922 Universal suffrage with voting age of 
25.   
Women’s suffrage. 
 
Table A6: Sweden (in sample from 1820) 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
(1809) Four estate system with some form of election to the 
Estate of Farmers and the Estate of Burghers.  
 
1866 Equal but restricted manhood suffrage with 
relatively high economic qualifications. 
Alternatively, property above a certain value; 
leasing of farmland above a certain value; income 
above given minima. Voting age 21. 
Partly direct, partly indirect 
elections. Secret ballot. 
Majority representation, 
mostly in single-member 
constituencies. 
1907 Almost universal and equal suffrage for male 
citizens of 24 years and over, excluding recipients 
of public poor relief. 
Direct elections; secret ballot; 
proportional representation. 
1919 Universal and equal suffrage for men and women of 
23 years and over. Recipients of public poor relief 
enfranchised. 
Women’s suffrage. Adopted 
in special session of the 
parliament in December 1918. 
 
 
Table A7: France (in sample from 1820).  
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
(1815) Almost universal and equal manhood 
suffrage (excluding dependents) for primary 
elections. Restricted and unequal manhood 
suffrage in the electoral colleges because of 
strict criteria of eligibility. 
Indirect elections. Primary 
assemblies elect lifetime members of 
electoral college. Electoral college 
elect member of parliament. 
Majority representation at both 
stages. 
1820 Restricted and unequal suffrage for male 
citizens of 30 years and over. General 
electorate restricted by high direct tax 
minima; the upper 25% of the general 
electorate paying higher direct taxes 
constituted an additional electoral body. 
Under Richelieu, the franchise was changed 
to give the wealthiest electors a double vote, 
in time for the November 1820 election. 
 
Direct elections: the general 
electorate elects 60% of member of 
parliament; the remaining 40% are 
elected by the assemblies of higher 
taxpayers. No strict provision for 
secrecy. Majority representation: 
absolute majority system in single 
member constituencies with third 
ballot run-off between top two 
candidates. 
Charles X dissolved the Chamber in 
1827 and 1830, so the de facto 
power of the Chamber was curtailed. 
1830 The Constitution of 1830 and the electoral 
law of 1831 introduce restricted but almost 
equal manhood suffrage for citizens of 25 
years and over; reduced direct tax minima. 
The property qualification was reduced to 
include everyone who paid a direct tax of 
200 (formerly 300) francs.  
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Majority representation: absolute 
majority system as before. 
1848 Universal and equal suffrage for all male  
citizens of 21 years and over. (The Second 
Republic).  
1852-
1869 
The de jure franchise rules were not 
changed. 
During the Second Empire from 
1852 to 1869, elections were 
systematically manipulated by the 
government to secure the return of 
compliant body of members. 
1870 Reintroduction of the suffrage rules from the 
Second Republic. These had formally been 
in operation during the Second Empire, so 
the franchise rules were not changed de jure. 
We count this as a reform year in the 
specifications where we take franchise 
contractions into account, but not in those 
where we don’t. 
The Third Republic: elections were 
able to function freely and fairly. 
(1945) Universal and equal suffrage for all men and 
women of 21 years and over. 
Women’s suffrage. Direct elections 
with secret ballot. Proportional 
representation in multi-member 
constituencies till 1951. 
 
 
Table A8: Germany (in sample from 1871, regresses to autocracy in 1933-342). 
Year Franchise 
extensions/contractions 
Other features 
1815-
1867 
No directly elected assembly 
at the confederal level. Each 
of the 41 member states had 
their own suffrage rules and 
there were direct elections to 
state assemblies in some 
states. 
The (Second) Germany Confederation. It was 
established at the Vienna Congress and reduced the 
number of independent German polities to 41. The 
two dominant powers were Prussia and Austria. The 
confederation was governed by a diet, a council of 
state, and a prime minister. Each state selected a 
representative to the diet (where a weighted voting 
system was used to make decisions). The states of 
the confederation retained most powers and could 
decide on their own constitutional rules, but the 
confederation required the states to adopt written 
constitutions. The federation could not raise taxes 
and was charged with the task of securing internal 
and external security. 
1848-
1849 
Elected parliament proposed 
but not adopted. Many states 
liberalized their suffrage 
rules. 
An attempt to reform the German confederal 
government was made in 1848-49 at the 
constitutional convention in Frankfurt. The members 
of the convention were elected on a broad suffrage 
that included wealth or tax-payment thresholds 
similar to those used by many state elections for 
their lower chambers. The convention could propose 
but not adopt reform. It proposed a constitutional 
monarchy for Germany with an elected parliament 
                                                 
2 We code Germany as democratic in 1933 since elections were held in that year. Accordingly, Germany exits in 
1934 when it effectively became a dictatorship. 
and ministers responsible to parliament and a new 
German crown (offered to the King of Prussia). The 
King of Prussia refused and the attempt at reform 
stopped there. 
1866  War between Austria and Prussia breaks the 
confederation up. 
1867 Similar to those applicable 
during the German Empire. 
Northern German Confederation established by 
Prussia.  
1871 Universal and equal suffrage 
for all male citizens of 25 
years and over in elections to 
the Reichstag.  
 
Each of the 25 member states 
had their own constitutions 
and rules for elections to their 
parliaments. 
 
 
Imperial Germany established when the southern 
states join the Northern German Confederation. 
Austria did not join and is treated as independent 
from 1867. Electoral corruption widespread. Direct 
elections, majority rule. The government was not 
constitutionally responsible to parliament. Under the 
constitution of 1871, executive power lay with the 
Bundesrat. The Bundesrat consisted of 
representatives of the member states according to a 
system of population weighting. This gave Prussia 
dominant influence. The appointment of the German 
Chancellor was retained by the King of Germany 
(and Prussia). The main duty of the central 
government was initially defense and the chancellor 
had control over the military and over foreign 
policy. This restricted the de facto influence of the 
electorate on federal policy and since the state 
constitutions often used wealth restrictions, voters 
also had limited influence on state policy. In 
practice, great powers were granted to the emperor, 
as the president of the federal council. The 
Reichstag was elected by universal and direct 
election with a secret ballot. 
1919 Universal and equal suffrage 
for men and women of 20 
years and over. 
All states (Länder) adopt this 
suffrage. 
The Weimar Republic. Direct and secret elections. 
Proportional representation. Women’s suffrage. The 
constitution of the German Empire adopted in 1871 
required that the Reichtag (the lower chamber) was 
elected by universal and direct election with a secret 
ballot. The Duchies, Kingdoms, and Free Cities, 
however, had their own constitutions and these 
typically prescribed that their lower chambers were 
elected on a wealth-based suffrage. The most 
important example of the three class system is the 
one operating in Prussia from 1848 till 1919. The 
Weimar Constitution required that the delegates [of 
the Reichstag] are elected by universal, equal, direct, 
and secret suffrage by men and women over twenty 
years of age, according to the principle of 
proportional representation and as pointed out by 
Congleton (2011, p. 479), the “final step to 
parliamentary democracy in Germany required a 
substantial increase in parliament’s authority over 
public policy, rather than suffrage expansion”. 
However, the Weimar Constitution (Article 17) 
required that every state must have a republican 
constitution and that all representatives must be 
elected according to the same rules as for the 
Reichstag. This implies that the Weimar 
Constitution extended the franchise in the states and 
as such can be viewed as a de jure franchise 
extension. This coding choice does not affect any of 
our results. 
1933  Though It did not obtain a majority in the Reichstag 
in March 1933, the Nazi government was able to 
pass the Enabling Act which effectively ended 
democracy. The Weimar Constitution of 1919 was 
never officially repealed, but the legal measures 
taken by the Nazi government in March 1933 meant 
that the constitution became irrelevant. 
 
Table A9: Finland (in the sample from 1820). 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
1820  Finland was an autonomous Grand 
Duchy of the Russian Empire from 
the end of the Finnish War between 
Sweden and Russia in 1809 until 
1917 when full independence was 
achieved. The old four-chamber Diet 
was re-activated in the 1860s and 
made new legislation concerning 
internal affairs. 
We let Finland enter the sample in 
1820, but none of the results 
depends on this choice. 
1869 The Diet Act of 1869 introduced a restricted 
and unequal franchise to the Diet based on 4 
estates: nobility, clergy, town, and peasants. In 
the estate of burgesses, plural voting according 
to local taxes paid; in the estate of peasants, the 
suffrage was restricted to owners of real estate 
or leaseholders. 
Direct elections to the estate of 
burgesses, indirect elections to the 
estate of peasants. No provisions for 
secrecy. 
 
1906 Universal and equal suffrage for all men and 
women over 24 years. 
The process that led to the November 
Manifesto and the parliament of Finland 
started with a general strike of 1905 (12–19 
November). During the general strike, the Red 
Declaration, written by Finnish politician and 
journalist Yrjö Mäkelin, was given in 
Tampere, demanding dissolution of the Senate 
of Finland, universal suffrage, political 
freedoms, and abolition of censorship. Leader 
The Diet was replaced by the 
Parliament of Finland. Direct 
elections with secret ballot. 
Proportional representation in multi-
member constituencies. Women’s 
suffrage. 
of the constitutionalists, Leo Mechelin crafted 
the November Manifesto that led to the 
abolition of the Diet of Finland and of the four 
Estates, and to the creation of the modern 
Parliament of Finland. 
 
 
Table A10: Belgium (in the sample from 1830). 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
1830  Independence from the Netherlands. 
1831 Equal but restricted manhood suffrage with 
high direct tax minima differing in urban 
and rural areas. Voting age 25. 
Leopold I enthroned as king on 21st 
July 1831. Constitutional monarchy. 
Direct elections but no provision for 
secrecy. Majority representation in 
multi-member constituencies; 
absolute majority required on first 
ballot, relative majority on second 
ballot. On 20 December, 1830 at the 
London Conference of 1830 
Belgium’s independence recognized. 
1848 Reduction and standardization of direct tax 
minima. 
 
1871 Voting age reduced to 21  
1877  Secret ballot. 
1893 Universal but unequal manhood suffrage. 
Plural voting with one additional vote for 
house owners and owners of real estate 
above a certain minima; two additional 
votes for citizens with higher education 
diploma and certain officials; maximum 
votes per person is 3 and minimum voting 
age is 21.  
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Compulsory voting; majority 
representation as before. 
1899  Proportional representation 
1919 Universal and equal manhood suffrage for 
men over 21. Plural voting abolished. 
Suffrage for mothers and widows of 
soldiers who had died in the war. 
Direct elections with secret ballot. 
Compulsory voting. Proportional 
representation. 
(1948) Universal and equal suffrage for all men 
and women over 21. 
Women’s suffrage. 
 
  
Table A11: Switzerland (in sample from 1848) 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
1830 The cantons had their own 
constitutional arrangements. 
“The July Revolution of 1830” in France 
launched a liberal movement in Europe 
which in Switzerland had the aim of 
transforming the union of separate and 
independent cantons into a united 
federation and converting the central 
council into an assembly elected by direct, 
universal and equal suffrage.” (Carstains, 
1980, p. 135). The 1832 constitution draft 
did not gain unanimity, and it was not until 
after the civil war in the mid-1840s that a 
revised constitution was adopted in May 
1848 and the Swish Confederation was 
established. 
1848 Universal and equal suffrage for male 
citizens of 20 years and over. This 
franchise applied to the national 
council. The rules for election to the 
states council was within the 
jurisdiction of the individual cantons 
and thus varied. 
The Swish Confederation. Direct elections, 
secret or oral voting according to canton 
legislation. Majority representation: 
constituencies varied in size (each voter 
having as many votes as seats to be filled); 
absolute majority required on first and 
second ballot, simple majority on third. 
The Constitution of 1848 established a 
federal assembly, which included a 
popularly elected national council and a 
council of the states in which the cantons 
were each equally represented. A federal 
council (the national executive) consisting 
of 7 members was directly elected by the 
federal assembly. The Swish constitution 
of 1848 was the outcome of civil war (3–
29 November 1847). The first attempt at a 
constitution, which split the district of 
Schwyz in two and moved the cantonal 
capital away from Schwyz, was narrowly 
defeated on 27 January 1848. The second 
constitution, which removed the 
mentioned points and merged the former 
districts of Wollerau and Pfäffikon in the 
district of March, was then approved by 
the electorate on 27 February 1848. The 
Swiss Constitution was established with 
the promulgation of the Constitution of 12 
September 1848. 
1850  The federal law of 1850 laid down the 
detailed rules governing elections to the 
national council. 
1864  Serious riots in Geneva in protest against 
misrepresentation. The canton fell into a 
state of anarchy, from which it was 
rescued only by the intervention of the 
other members of the Swiss 
Confederation. 
1872 Unchanged Secret ballot according to federal 
legislation. 
1919 Unchanged Proportional representation. 
(1971) Universal and equal suffrage for men 
and women of 20 years and over. 
Women’s suffrage. 
 
Table A12: Denmark (in the sample from 1820). 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
1820  Absolute monarchy. 
1831 Franchise based on property 
ownership. Allowed the nobility, 
the property owners in the cities 
and major farmers to vote. 
Advisory regional councils 
(Staenderforsamlingerne) re-established by the 
King. First meetings in 1835. 
1849  Equal but restricted suffrage for 
male citizens of 30 years and over, 
except servants and farm laborers 
not having their own household 
and those receiving or having 
received public poor relief. 
Bi-cameral system. Direct elections; voting by 
ballot or by show of hands. Majority 
representation: simple plurality system in 
single-member constituencies. The 
announcement of constitutional reform was 
made from the balcony of the King’s palace on 
March 18, 1848. 
1866  A constitutional revision in which the major 
landowners and the wealthier middle classes 
succeeded in introducing changes which 
conferred electoral privileges upon themselves, 
and ensured that there would be a Conservative 
majority in the Landsting [the Upper 
Chamber]. The franchise rules for the Lower 
Chamber were unchanged. 
1875-
1901 
 The Liberals gained a majority, and between 
1875 and 1901 the Conservative government 
ruled by means of provisional legislation 
without the authority of the parliament. 
1901 Unchanged From 1901, a system that made the 
government responsible to the government was 
introduced along with the secret ballot.  
1915 Universal and equal suffrage for all 
men and women of 29 years and 
over. The election required for the 
change in the constitution took 
place on May 7. 
Direct elections with secret ballot. Proportional 
representation. Women had obtained the right 
to vote for local elections in 1909. 
1920 Voting age reduced to 25.  
 
The broader European sample 
 
Table A13: Hungary (in the sample from 1867). 
Year Franchise 
extensions/contractions 
Other features 
1820 A Hungarian Diet  Part of the Habsburg Empire and under Austrian 
control within the German Confederation.  
1848  Hungarian Revolution. After the unsuccessful 
revolution, Emperor Franz Joseph again assumed 
absolute control and divided the non-German part of 
the Austrian Empire into four distinct territories: 
Hungary, Transylvania, Croatia-Slavonia, and 
Vojvodina.  
1867 See under Austria. Autonomy within the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. 
Fiscal and foreign policy jointly determined. 
1918-
20 
 Involved in wars to establish borders. 
1920 New franchise rules more 
restricted than under the 
1867 constitution. 
New constitution. 
1921-
31  
 Governed by a conservative leader. 
1929  Social unrest.  
1932-
36 
 Fascist parties gained power and made close 
alliances with Germany. 
1936  The Prime Minister Gyula Gombos promises a 
“model Nazi state” within two years, but it was not 
achieved before 1938. We keep Hungary in the 
sample till 1938 but since one could argue that it 
regressed to autocracy in 1936, we have checked that 
none of the results depends on this choice. 
 
 
Table A14: Russia (in sample from 1820, regressed into civil war 1917-183). 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
1814  The control of the Kingdom of Poland 
confirmed at the Congress of Wien.  
1820 The Governing Senate was a legislative, 
judicial, and executive body of Russian 
Monarchs and lasted until the end of the 
Russian Empire (in 1917). 
Russian Empire. 
1825  Rebellion. 
1830  Zar Nikolai frightened by the French 
revolution. This leads to enhanced 
control and repression. 
1848  Zar Nikolai frightened by the French 
and German revolutions. This leads to 
                                                 
3 The civil war is dated as starting in November 1917, and we let Russia exit the sample in1918. 
enhanced control and repression. 
1853-
56 
 Kremlin War with Turkey, the UK and 
France. 
1861  Freedom for the peasants and other 
reforms, including the introduction of 
locally elected bodies to run social 
security etc.; operational in 1864 
(country) and 1870 (town). Legal 
system reformed. 
1864  Conquest of central Asia starts. 
1874  Conscription army. 
1881  New Zar rolls back some of the liberal 
reforms. 
1904-
05 
 Russian-Japanese war. 
1905  First Russian Revolution. Peaceful 
demonstration ends with bloodbath, but 
demonstrations continue. 
1906 All men of voting age, but indirect 
elections and multiple votes. On 18 
February 1905 the Tzar offered to hold 
elections to a consultative assembly to 
calm the situation. 
Restricted constitutional rule. Bi-
cameral system with broad suffrage for 
the lower chamber. Veto retained with 
the Tzar. 
1907 Restrictions on suffrage to insure a 
conservative Duma. Elections held 
between 1907 and 1917. 
 
1917  October revolution and subsequent 
civil war. 
 
 
Table A15: Poland (in sample from 1918). 
Year Franchise 
extensions/contractions 
Other features 
1815  The Kingdom of Poland is established at the Congress of 
Vienna but the King is the Russian Emperor Alexander 
1, so Poland is not an independent state.  
1830  November uprising inspired by events in France and 
Belgium. Brutally suppressed by the Russians in 1831. 
1846  Peasant revolt in part of Poland that is under Austrian 
control, the result is that Krakow becomes part of 
Austria. Repression used. 
1848  Rebellion against Prussia and Austria under inspiration 
from revolutionary events elsewhere in Europe. 
Repression very bloody. 
1863  Rebellion in the Kingdom of Poland, demanding 
freedom for peasants. Repression by Russia was the 
result in 1864. 
1867  Galicja (the south-eastern part of Poland) obtains 
national independence, Polish culture can flourish in 
Krakow. Other parts under German control are 
suppressed. 
1890s  Two political parties develop. Right-wing, anti-Semitic, 
and anti-German party; Left-wing socialist party. 
1918  An independent Poland established at the peace 
conference in Paris, but must fight the neighbors to 
establish borders (lost to Czechoslovakia in 1919-20 but 
gained Vilinus in 1920).  
1921 The May Constitution: A 
broad franchise. 
 
Republic of Poland: Democratic constitution; bi-cameral 
system with weak president (“very democratic 
constitution”). 13 governments between 1919 and 1926. 
1926 Franchise rules nominally 
unchanged. 
Coup. August Novelization was a set of amendments to 
the 1921 (May) Constitution by which the power of the 
executive was enhanced. There were four main clauses 
in the amendments: 
(1) The President may dismiss the Sejm (parliament) 
and the Senate.  
(2) The President may issue acts having statutory 
power with the approval of the Sejm.  
(3) The Sejm may not dissolve itself.  
(4) If the Sejm cannot agree on the state budget, the 
budget may be passed by the government. 
1935 Franchise rules nominally 
unchanged. 
The April Constitution was the general law passed by 
the act of the Polish Sejm on 23 April 1935. It 
introduced a presidential system with certain elements of 
authoritarianism. The President had wide-ranging power 
to dismiss parliament and to veto legislation. 
 
 
Table A16: Serbia (in sample from 1820). 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
1815  National  Assembly, the Skupstina, 
established. It consisted of 22 district 
heads, who were nominated by the 
Prince, and representatives of the town 
and parish counties, whose members–
prominent merchants, priests, etc.–were 
nominated by the district heads. A 
purely consultative body that convened 
once a year. 
1830 No elections held Serbia became an internationally 
recognized autonomous principality 
under Turkish sovereignty and Russian 
protection. 
1835 No elections held. Demands for representative institutions 
and suppression of five rebellions. The 
Prince eventually agreed to let the 
Skupestina pass a constitution 
(Constitution of 1835) to limit his 
power, but this was abolished under 
pressure from England among others, 
and the Constitution of 1835 did not 
become operational. 
1838 
(operative 
in 1839) 
No elections held. Constitution of 1838. New constitution 
negotiated under Turkish influence. A 
new state council of 17 life members 
and a cabinet of four were duly 
instituted. 
1839-58  Period of oligarchy.  
1858-60  The power of the Skupstina undermine 
by Prince.  
1860-68  Enlightened absolutism 
1868 Elections with relatively wide 
suffrage. 
Constitution of 1868. The constitution 
drew to some extent upon the early 
nineteenth-century German 
constitutional monarchies. The main 
features were: recognition of the 
hereditary rights of the Obranovic 
dynasty, the legislative power to be 
shared by the Prince and the Skupstina, 
the council remained a consultative 
body, the government only responsible 
to the Prince, principle of freedom of 
press, and judges to be independent. 
1870 General elections in 1874 and 1875. Election law adopted. 
1875  Rebellion against the Turks in 
Hercegovina. 
1876  War with Turkey. Peace in 1877 on the 
basis of the status quo. 
1877  Russo-Turkish war; Serbia gets 
involved in 1878. Unrestricted 
independence declared. Territorial 
gains. 
1881 Election won by Progressists and 
Radicals (the Liberal lost). 
First time organized political parties 
compete for power. 
1881  Secret Serbo-Austrian convention 
which prevented Serbia from entering 
political treaties with other countries 
without the consent of Austria. 
1882  Kingdom of Serbia declared. 
1883 Election with Radical victory, but a 
Progressits government appointed by 
the King. 
 
1885  Serbo-Bulgarian war. Status quo 
preserved. 
1886 Election, one-seat majority to the 
Progressits. 
 
1888 Election resulting in Progressits 
majority. 
 
1888 In the elections to the Skupstina, apart 
from soldiers of the active army, all 
male citizens of full age may vote if 
they pay 15 dinars in direct taxes. The 
tax payment requirement is higher for 
elections (60 dinars). 
Constitution of 1888. The constitution, 
proposed by the Radical Party in 
response to the egalitarian aspirations 
of the nation's agrarian majority, 
adopted a French constitutional model - 
with a unicameral system and frequent 
coalition governments. Shaped on the 
model of the Belgian Constitution of 
1831, which in its turn was a modified 
version of the French Charter of 1830, 
it restored a French influence, 
expressed for the first time in the 1835 
Constitution. It guaranteed civil and 
political rights; including the freedom 
of speech, abolished summery courts; 
gave the Skupstina the right to table 
bills, to pass the budget and introduced 
direct elections and the secret ballot.  
1893 Election, rigging gives Liberal 
majority.  
Coup d’etat when a minor declares 
himself of age. No change in the 
constitution as such. 
1894 This represents a de jure franchise 
contraction. 
Constitution of 1868 replaces that of 
1888. 
1895 Election returns Progressits majority.  
1901  Constitution of 1901 introduces a bi-
cameral system in an attempt of 
upholding the influential role of the 
ruler, while limiting that of the Radical 
Party, which had enjoyed an ample 
electoral support since the 1888 
Constitution. 
1903 Elections in 1905, 1906, 1908, 1912. 
Restoration represents a de jure (and 
de facto) franchise extension relative 
to 1868 and 1901 constitution. 
Restore the Constitution of 1888. 
Serbia becomes a parliamentary 
democracy, with a pre-dominant two 
party system. 
1912-13  Balkan Wars. 
1918  Serbia becomes part of Yugoslavia (at 
first the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovens). 
1920 Elections and political competition, 
but with a ban on the Communist 
party. Franchise relatively broad. 
Election to a constitutional convention 
adopted centralist constitution. 
1931 1931 constitution was accompanied 
by an electoral law which ensured a 
large government majority. Anti-
democratic. 
King Alexander’s dictatorship (1929-
34). Repression of, in particular, 
communists. 
1935 Election held in conditions of greater 
freedom, but still with a system that 
allowed the government to hold on to 
the majority. 
 
(1939) Election with Radical majority as a 
result. 
 
 
 
Table A17: Rumania (in sample from 1856, regress to autocracy 1938) 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
1856 Some limited elections via 
“Landsdag”. 
Independence in part by the treaty of Paris 
(1856) and in full by the treaty of Berlin (1878). 
1866 The franchise was governed by 
property, income and literacy 
requirements. 
The constitution established a liberal monarchy 
with a responsible ministry and a parliament of 
two elective chambers, but with most of the 
power with the Prince. 
 
1907  Peasant rising suppressed violently. 
1923 Universal male suffrage.  Most of the power with the King. 
1938  Military dictatorship. 
 
 
Table A18: Greece (in sample from 1822) 
Year Franchise 
extensions/contractions 
Other features 
1821  War of independence, with independence declared in 
1822. 
1822 Universal but unequal male 
suffrage. 
Indirect elections. 
1844 Universal and equal male 
suffrage with voting age of 
25.  
Direct majority elections in multi-member 
constituencies. Multiple voting. Secret ballot whereby 
voters could write the name of the candidate in private. 
Illiterates helped by pooling officers. 
1864 Voting age reduced to 21. Lead ball system replaced ballots. Candidates elected 
by plurality system in one ballot in which a yes or no 
vote was expressed by putting the ball into the 
appropriate box. From 1923 paper ballots in some 
provinces. From1926 paper ballots in all provinces 
1926 Unchanged Proportional representation introduced. 
1928 Unchanged Majority system introduced. 
1929 Unchanged Compulsory voting introduced. 
 
  
Table A19: Iceland (in sample from 1874). 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
1814-
1873 
 In 1814, following the 
Napoleonic Wars, Iceland 
remained a Danish 
dependency. 
1845  The modern parliament, 
Alþingi (English: Althing), 
was founded in 1845 as an 
advisory body to the Danish 
monarch. 
1874 Right to vote restricted to men aged 25 and over in 
charge of own finances and property and not 
receiving poor relief. Census and capacity 
conditions: 1) farmers paying tax over a given 
minimum; 2) town burghers and fishermen paying 
communal tax over eight crowns; 3) owners of real 
estate paying a communal tax of 12 crowns on 
house property; 4) civil servants; and 5) graduates 
of university and divinity school. 
Denmark granted Iceland a 
constitution and limited home 
rule. 
Direct elections of 30 MPs; 
majority system with multiple 
votes. 6 MPs appointed by the 
Danish King. 
1903  Simper plurality system 
introduced. 
1904  Home rule expanded.  
1908 As before with two modifications: 1) tax for non-
farm laborers lowered to 4 crowns; 2) graduates of 
medical schools granted voting rights. 
Directly elected MP increased 
from 30 to 34. 6 appointed by 
the Danish King. 
1916 Universal suffrage for men and women with age 
restrictions for women and servants; recipients of 
poor relief not included.  
Direct elections and all 40 
members now elected. 
Women’s suffrage. 
1918  The Danish-Icelandic Act of 
Union, an agreement with 
Denmark signed on 1 
December 1918 and valid for 
25 years, recognized Iceland 
as a fully sovereign state in a 
personal union with the King 
of Denmark. 
1920 Age restrictions for women and servants abolished. Mixed PR-plurality system 
introduced. 
1934 Voting age lowered for men and women. 
Recipients of poor relief enfranchised. 
 
(1944)  The Republic of Iceland was 
established. 
 
  
Table A20: Luxembourg (in sample from 1820). 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
1815  Luxembourg was disputed between 
Prussia and the Netherlands. The Congress 
of Vienna established Luxembourg as a 
Grand Duchy in personal union with the 
Netherlands. Luxembourg also became a 
member of the German Confederation. 
Since the country exists as an independent 
state from 1815 to 1838, we let it enter the 
sample in 1820. 
1839  The Belgian Revolution of 1830–1839 
reduced Luxembourg's territory by more 
than half. The First Treaty of London 
reaffirmed Luxembourg's independence. 
1841 Suffrage limited to men of 25 years and 
over paying a yearly tax of 10 guilders. 
The tax was 20 for the electors. 
Indirect elections. 
1848 Census (tax) reduced from 10 guilders to 
10 francs. 
Direct elections. The Constitution of 
Luxembourg was acutely amended on 20 
March, 1848. 
1857 Census of 10-125 francs for indirect 
elections in the cantons and over 125 for 
direct elections in the districts. But the 
same year, in which direct elections 
were abolished, the census was generally 
established at 10 francs. 
Mixed indirect and direct elections. 
1860 Census requirement raised to 30 francs. Direct elections replace indirect elections. 
1867  The Second Treaty of London affirms 
Luxembourg's independence and 
neutrality.  
1868 Census requirement kept at a payment of 
30 francs. 
Direct and equal elections. 
1879  Secret ballot. 
1893 Census requirement reduced to 15 
francs. 
 
1902 Census requirement reduced to 10 
francs. 
 
1919 Universal and equal suffrage for both 
men and women. Voting age 21. 
Proportional representation introduced. 
Direct elections. 
 
  
Table A21: Portugal (in from 1820, regress to autocracy in 1926). 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
1820 All free male citizens entitled to vote for the 
constitutional assembly. 
Indirect elections. 
1822 Franchise for all men aged 25 and over, except for 
males under guardianship, servants, and friars.  
Direct elections. Secret 
ballot. 
1826 Franchise for all men aged 25 and over with an income 
of 100 milreis a year, except for males under 
guardianship, servants and friars. Voting age of 21, and 
over for members of clergy, married men, military 
officers and persons with higher education. 
Indirect elections. The 
Carta constitution. Two-
chamber parliament. This 
charter formed the basis 
for election till 1910 (the  
1838-
42 
Census requirement reduced to 80 milreis. Direct elections. 
1852 Census requirement abolished for teachers, graduates of 
universities, and the clergy. 
Direct elections in multi-
member constituencies. 
1878 Franchise extended to all men aged 21 and over who 
were heads-of-households or who could read and write. 
 
1895 Income requirement for illiterates halved. Head-of-
household qualification discontinued. This on the 
allowed more illiterates to vote, but the reduced caused 
by the discontinuation of the head-of-household 
franchise reduced the number of voters by more. So the 
net result was a contraction. Mackie and Rose (1991, 
Chapter 20) suggest that the contraction was from 70% 
to 47%.  
 
1911 Enfranchisement of all men of 21 years and over who 
could read and write plus heads-of-households (similar 
to the 1878 electoral law). Tax qualifications were 
abolished. 
Mixed electoral system. 
The Monarchy was 
overthrown and a republic 
declared. 
1913 The head-of-household qualification abolished thus 
contracting the size of the electorate. 
 
1926  Dictatorship. 
 
Table A22: Spain (in sample from 1820, civil war from 1936) 
Year Franchise extensions/contractions Other features 
(1812) Constitution of Cadiz (or of 1812): Universal 
manhood suffrage with voting age at 21; all 
financially-independent men enfranchised. 
The constitution introduced 
the principles of universal 
male suffrage, national 
sovereignty, constitutional 
monarchy and freedom of the 
press, and supported land 
reform and free enterprise. 
(1814)  Constitution abolished by 
Ferdinand VII. 
1820-
1823 
Constitution of Cadiz reinstated. Ferdinand VII’s misrule 
provoked a revolt in favor of 
the Constitution of 1812 and 
he was held prisoner till 1823. 
1823-
1833 
Absolutism. Ferdinand VII used his veto powers to 
prevent the liberal governments from functioning. 
Ferdinand VII regained power 
after French invasion. 
Relentless restoration of 
reactionary absolutism. 
1827  Reactionary revolt (known as 
"War of the Agraviados"). 
Suppressed. 
1834-
1836 
Royal statute (Estatuto Real): census introduced on 
the basis of tax payment and voting age raised to 30 
years. This reduced the suffrage relative to the 
Constitution of Cadiz but expanded it relative to the 
de facto franchise between 1823 and 1833. 
Indirect elections in two 
steps. Bicameral parliament 
with elected lower house and 
appointed Senate. 
1836 Restoration of 1812 constitution, while preparing 
the Constitution of 1837. 
A coup by sergeants of the 
Spanish Royal Guard. 
1837 Constitution of 1837: franchise for all men aged 25 
and over who either paid annual tax of 200 reales, 
had yearly income of 1500 reales, paid 3000 reales 
of lease holding or rent, or were inhabitants of a 
house of a sufficient rental value. About five 
percent of the population had the right to vote. 
Broader franchise than under the Royal Charge, but 
narrower than under the Constitution of 1812. 
Direct elections with a broad 
electorate choosing a lower 
house (the Chamber of 
Deputies), while the upper 
house (the Senate) was 
appointed by the monarch.  
1840-
43 
 Constitution of 1837 partially 
suspended by Regent 
Baldomero Espartero, who 
ruled by decree between 1840 
and 1843. 
1845 Constitution of 1845: census requirement increased 
to 400 reales, census of 200 reales only for some 
professional categories. Narrowed the franchise to 
less than one percent of the population, i.e., more 
restricted than the Constitution of 1837. 
Direct elections (two ballots). 
1854  Election law of 1837 used to 
elect a constitutional 
assembly. 
1856  New constitution passed by 
the Parliament but not 
enacted by the Queen. 
1865 Census halved to 200 reales (100 for certain 
professional categories). 
Single-ballot with plurality 
rule. 
1869 Constitution of 1869: universal male suffrage, 
voting age 25. 
Glorious Revolution 
Constitution. 
1876 Constitution of 1876: Universal suffrage repealed. 
Voting age 25. Franchise limited to persons paying 
a property tax of 25 pesetas, a yearly trade tax of 50 
pesetas, or possessing a higher educational 
qualification. 
Restoration Constitution. 
While theoretically 
democratic, elections were 
routinely rigged by the 
governing party, and in 
practice power was shared by 
two alternating parties (the 
“turno” system). 
1888 Universal male suffrage reintroduced. Voting age 
25. 
 
1890 Members of certain corporations formed special 
constituencies to ensure representation. 
 
1907 Voting age reduced to 23. Compulsory voting. 
1923  During Primo de Rivera's 
dictatorship (1923–1930) 
many of the Constitution of 
1876’s articles were 
suspended in a de facto 
dictatorship. 
1931 Second Republic Constitution. Universal and equal 
male suffrage with voting age of 23.  
Secret ballot.  
1936-
1939 
 Civil war. During the Civil 
War (1936–1939) the 
Constitution of 1831 was 
abolished by the Nationalists 
and widely disregarded in the 
Republican zone. 
1938 Franco’s dictatorship.  
 
  
Table B1: Major Revolutionary Events, 1820-1938. 
Events Region Year 
Revolution in Hungary (Moravia, Transylvania and Wallachia). 
Started in May 1848. 
 
Eastern 
Europe 1848-49 
The “aster flowers” revolution in Hungary, ending with foreign 
military intervention and counter revolution in 1919. The initial 
revolution was led by Károlyi with support from the army and 
supporters of the social democratic party wearing aster flowers. 
Started in November 1918. 
Eastern 
Europe 1918-19 
Generalized revolution from 1820 to 1823 in Spain (Liberal 
Revolution in Spain of January 1, 1820). It was started by Mutiny of 
Spanish troops under Colonel Rafael Riego. This was an example of 
the military pronunciamento: Liberal colonels organised in their own 
secret officers’ brotherhoods ordered their regiments to follow them 
into insurrections. It was termination by a French invasion in 1823.  Iberia 1820-23 
Revolution at Oporto, Portugal. This liberal revolution started 
January in Porto, quickly spreading without resistance to several 
other Portuguese cities and towns, culminating with the revolt of 
Lisbon. The revolutionaries demanded the immediate return of the 
royal court to continental Portugal, demanded a constitutional 
monarchy to be set up in Portugal and restoration of Portuguese 
exclusivity in the trade with Brazil. Iberia 1820 
Portuguese insurrection of General Pimenta de Castro. The 
republicans supported by the Navy and violent civil groups revolted.  
Started in May. Iberia 1915 
Belgian revolution against Holland. Started August 25. Belgium 1830-33 
Easter Rebellion in Ireland. The rising was suppressed after seven 
days of fighting, and its leaders were court-martialled and executed. 
British 
Isles 1916 
July Revolution 
French 
states 1830 
French Revolution, February 
French 
states 1848 
State collapse, occupation, republican revolutions. 
French 
states 1870 
Multiple communes. In Paris, resentment against the government 
arose and from April – May 1871 Paris workers and National Guards 
revolted and established the Paris Commune, which maintained a 
radical left-wing regime for two months until its bloody suppression 
by Thiers' government in May 1871. 
French 
states 1871 
Russian revolution (unsuccessful), January 9 
Russian 
states 1905 
Russian revolution (successful), February 
Russian 
states 1917 
Revolutions in Naples and Sardinia. The Carbonari organized anti-
absolutist riots in Naples in July. This led to the 1820 revolution 
which forced King Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies to promise a 
constitutional monarchy and the King of Sardina to accept liberal 
reform. The revolutions were in the end repressed.  Italy 1820 
Italian states. Insurrection in Palermo, Sicily, spreads to the mainland 
in January, Risings in the Habsburg provinces in early March.  Italy 1848-49 
Habsburg. Street fighting in Vienna in March. Austria 1848-49 
German states. First event March 3. Germany 1848-49 
 
  
Table B2: Minor Revolutionary Events.  
Events Region Year 
Janissary rebellion in Constantinople Balkans 1826 
Pro-constitutional uprising in Greece Balkans 1843 
Revolt in Herzegovina, supported by Montenegro Balkans 1861 
Revolt in Crete Balkans 1866-68 
Insurrections in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Bulgaria Balkans 1875-78 
Pro-Bulgarian revolution in Eastern Roumelia Balkans 1885 
Peasant insurrection in Romania Balkans 1888 
Peasant insurrection in Moldovia Balkans 1907 
Young Turks’ revolution in the Ottoman Empire, including 
insurrection in Macedonia Balkans 1908-09 
Albanian insurrection Balkans 1910 
Venezelist rising in Greece Balkans 1935 
Revolt in Crete Balkans 1938 
Royalist rising in Spain Iberia 1822-23 
Reactionary revolt (known as "War of the Agraviados" 
(malcontents)) in Catalonia and other regions of Spain.  Iberia 1827 
Progressist insurrection in Andalusia, Aragon, Catalonia and 
Madrid, ending in constitution of 1837 Iberia 1836 
Revolt of General Baldomero Espartero who seized power in 
Spain Iberia 1840 
Rising in Barcelona, temporary declaration of republic, crushed 
by Espartero Iberia 1842 
Spanish revolution led by O'Donnell and Espartero Iberia 1854-56 
Failed insurrection of General Juan Primenta Iberia 1866 
Generalized of insurrection (Pronunciamento of Admiral Juan 
Topete) Iberia 1868 
First Spanish Republic, Carlists rising Iberia 1873-74 
Anarchist outrages in Spain Iberia 1890 
Catalan general strike, insurrection Iberia 1909 
Insurrection in Lisbon, proclamation of republic Iberia 1910 
Royalist uprising in Northern Portugal Iberia 1919 
Failed insurrection against Portuguese military regime (by 
1930, Salazar in power). Iberia 1927 
Barcelona rising of anarchists and syndicalists Iberia 1933 
Working-class insurrection in Asturias, general strike and 
insurrection in Catalonia Iberia 1934 
Polish rebellion in Greater Poland 
Russian 
states 1830-31 
Polish rebellion in Greater Poland 
Russian 
states 1863-64 
  
Table B3: Other Revolutionary Events.  
Events Region Year 
Independence war in Moldavia, Wallachia Balkans 1821-24 
Independence war in Crete Balkans 1821-25 
Independence war in Greece Balkans 1821-31 
Independence war in Albania Balkans 1830-35 
Independence war in Bosnia Balkans 1831-36 
Independence war in Moldavia Balkans 1848 
Independence wars in Montenegro Balkans 1852-59 
Military coup in Greece, king deposed Balkans 1862 
Independence war in Bosnia Balkans 1862 
Independence war in Serbia Balkans 1862 
Independence wars in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Thessaly during 
Russo-Turkish war Balkans 1878 
Independence war in Crete Balkans 1878 
Independence war in Crete, Greek and British intervention Balkans 1896-98 
Independence war in Macadonia Balkans 1902-03 
Independence war in Crete Balkans 1905 
Independence war in Romania Balkans 1909 
Independence war in Albania during the Balkan war Balkans 1912 
Overthrow of Stamboliski in Bulgaria Balkans 1923 
Portuguese civil war Iberia 1823-24 
British landing in Portugal, supporting constitutionalists Iberia 1827 
Portuguese coup d’etat by Dom Miguel, followed by Miguelite 
wars to 1834 Iberia 1828 
Carlist war in Spain Iberia 1833-39 
Frequent insurrections in Portugal Iberia 1834-53 
Spanish coup on behalf of Queen Cristina, defeated Iberia 1841 
Coalition deposes Espartero; Narvaez president until 1851  Iberia 1843 
Portuguese civil wars Iberia 1846-50 
Military coup, continuation of Carlist wars to 1876, then 
another coup on behalf of Alfonso, son of deposed Queen 
Isabella Iberia 1874,1876 
Sporadic revolts, strikes and conspiracies in Portugal Iberia 
1889-
1908 
Lisbon general strike Iberia 1912 
Uprising and seizure of power by General Sidonio Paes 
(assassinated 1918) in Portugal, defeated general strike Iberia 1917 
Mutiny of Barcelona garrison, outbreak of separatist movement, 
coup of Primo de Rivera Iberia 1923 
Attempted coup in Portugal Iberia 1925 
Successful coup in Portugal Iberia 1926 
Attempted coup in Catalonia Iberia 1926 
Mutiny of garrison at Jaca in Spain, demanding republic Iberia 1930 
Spanish elections with large majority for Republicans; Alfonso 
leaves, new constitution Iberia 1931 
Military revolt led by General Jose Sanjurjo (in Spain) Iberia 1932 
Spanish civil war Iberia 1936-39 
Civil war in Ireland, Irish independence British 1919-23 
Isles 
Louis Napoleon’s coup France 1851 
Kirghiz vs. Russia (violence that erupted over conscription of 
Muslims for service in World War I) 
Russian 
states 1916 
Russian civil war, broad international intervention 
Russian 
states 1917-21 
Civil war  Switzerland 1845-47 
 
 
Table C1: Summary Statistics for the Variables used in the Analysis.  
Variable #Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Suffrage 1297 47.46 38.60 0.00 110.10 
TRu (unweighted, major) 1403 0.24 0.73 0.00 5.00 
TRg (geographical, major) 1403 0.35 1.28 0.00 15.11 
TRl (linguistic, major) 1403 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.44 
TRg (geographical, all) 1403 0.71 1.40 0.00 15.11 
Suffrage reforms abroad 1448 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.61 
Log GDP per capita 1280 7.74 0.45 6.66 8.76 
Trend GDP 1110 7.82 0.42 6.85 8.76 
Cycle GDP 1110 0.0004 0.03 -0.18 0.16 
Log Population 1413 8.85 1.21 6.79 11.10 
Urbanization rate 1278 206.09 152.54 0.00 732.00 
War 1330 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00 
WWI 1403 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
War intensity 1413 0.008 0.08 0.00 1.00 
Social learning 1403 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.61 
Gold standard 1403 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Education attainment 1237 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Trade volume 948 45.01 25.63 2.24 140.17 
Wheat price spread 529 0.46 0.17 0.22 1.13 
Agricultural share 952 404.23 157.97 52.00 821.05 
Repression 657 46.92 14.48 16.70 89.20 
Fiscal transfers 1007 9.46 10.96 0.00 50.40 
ALHome 1192 0.44 0.55 0.00 3.05 
ALAbroad 1192 0.10 0.21 0.00 1.73 
Log Rainfall 809 4.2 0.34 3.32 5.18 
Rainfall, growth 809 -0.0005 0.14 -0.45 0.44 
Gini coefficient 1315 0.52 0.02 0.47 0.56 
 
  
Table D1: Results from the Event History Study I, Western European Sample. 
Dependent variable: reform.  
 (1) (2)c (3) (4) 
TRg   0.50*** 0.67*** 0.51*** 
  [7.76] [3.62] [7.79] 
TRg (all) 0.46***    
 [5.73]    
Trend  1.49   
  [1.23]   
Cycle  -3.42   
  [0.49]   
Repression   -0.05**  
   [-2.12]  
Fiscal transfers    0.04 
    [0.55] 
Authors of Liberty, home     
     
Authors of Liberty, abroad     
     
Observations 713 699 394 628 
Number of countries 11 11 9 b 9 b 
Estimation technique Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Notes:  z statistics based on clustered (by country) standard errors  in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Only ten countries are included in the event history study as 
Switzerland had full male suffrage from the time it became unified. All estimations allow for duration 
dependence of the hazard rate and include the same control variables as in Table 8 in the main text. a. Data from 
Finland are missing. b. Data from Austria and Germany are missing. c. Log GDP per capita is replaced by cycle 
and trend. 
